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Chapter 1
Introduction
When and how does a child’s human capital, including both cognitive and non-cognitive
skills, develop? Scholars have noted that the early stage of life (i.e., the first five years)
is crucial for the accumulation of human capital (Santrock, 1998; Grantham-McGregor
et al., 2007). Cunha and Heckman (2007) propose that there are two characteristics of
human capital accumulation: complementarity and self-productivity, which implies that
investment in education should start at the first stages of childhood. Many empirical studies
also provide evidence that early intervention, when a child is a preschooler, has a high rate
of return (Currie and Thomas, 2000; Campbell et al., 2008; Heckman et al., 2010; Reynolds
et al., 2011).
During childhood, especially in the pre-school years, parents’ investment is one of the
most important determinants of child human capital accumulation. A large literature has
revealed that family income, background, school quality etc., all have significant effects on
child human capital. Becker and Tomes (1986) and Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011)
indicate that liquidity constraints, defined as the inability to raise money for investment
or consumption smoothing purpose, have a negative effect on parents’ investment in their
child’s human capital.
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In the context of developing countries, the link between a child’s human capital and
liquidity constraints may be potentially strong. Human capital accumulation is both a
method of obtaining development and a goal for developing countries. Ever since Schultz
(1963) introduced the importance of education in economics, scholars have discussed the
relationship between human capital and economic development. Lucas (1988) and Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992) developed theoretical models that emphasize the role of human
capital accumulation in economic growth. Barro (1991) empirically demonstrated that
initial school enrollment, a proxy for human capital, was positively related to the growth
rate of real GDP per capita between 1969 and 1985. Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) used
international data on mathematics and science test scores as measures of human capital to
demonstrate a positive relationship between cognitive skills and growth from 1960 to 1990.
Glewwe and Jacoby (2004) indicates that education is the primary route for developing
countries to escape from poverty.
Because there is wide agreement about the positive relationship between education and
growth, policymakers have established education as one of the top priorities in their de-
velopment agenda. For example, the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals have
named education as two out of eight development goals, and many developing countries have
set universal primary and secondary education as one of their development goals. Vietnam,
for example, has formally developed a “Socio-economic development strategy for the pe-
riod of 2011–2020” that includes the enhancement of the quality of primary and secondary
education, and also universalization of pre-school education.
Financial development is another key engine of growth (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991;
Greenwood and Smith, 1997; Hassan, Sanchez, and Yu, 2011). Unfortunately, developing
countries are often behind in this area. The “Global Financial Development Report 2014”
of the World Bank (2014a) provides indices to measure the extent of financial development
for each country. The percent of private credit, which is calculated by dividing the amount
of financial deposits in banks by gross domestic product (GDP), is 53 percent worldwide,
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107 percent for developed economies, and 34 percent for developing countries. Accessibility
to financial institutions is lower for developing economies: the percentage of people who
have an account at a formal financial institution in developing economies is 30 percent,
compared to 87 percent in developed economies. Hence, financial development may be
crucial in determining the liquidity constraint status for households in developing countries.
The link between liquidity constraint and human capital accumulation has been an
attractive topic for scholars (e.g. Becker and Tomes (1986) and Jacoby and Skoufias (1997)).
However, few things are known about the effect of liquidity constraints on human capital
development for young children of pre-school age. Also, most studies of developing countries
have measured human capital in terms of schooling, and measured the effect of liquidity
constraints on child’s schooling. Few things are revealed on the effect of liquidity constraints
on a child’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills in the context of developing countries.
My first and third essays contribute to the literature on the link between parents’ liq-
uidity constraints and children’s human capital accumulation, measured by cognitive and
non-cognitive skills. The first essay, entitled “Effect of liquidity constraints on school learn-
ing in Vietnam,” attempts to determine whether the liquidity constraints of parents and
the timing of such constraints matter in the development of children’s cognitive skills. The
third essay, “Effect of liquidity constraints on children’s non-cognitive skills in Vietnam,”
measures the effect of parents’ liquidity constraints on childrens non-cognitive skills, such
as self-esteem, self-efficacy, and aspirations.
The second essay deals with a different issue: the effect of licensing on the engineers’
labor market. Occupational licensing has been growing in the U.S. labor market over the
last decades. For the engineers, the regulation began in 1990 and now all 50 states require
licensure for the practice of civil engineers. The license status of engineers varies by the
type of engineer: civil engineers are most regulated while industrial engineers are the less
regulated. This essay presents theoretical and empirical analysis about the licensing status
of engineers on their labor market by the type of engineers.
3
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 estimates the effect of parents’
liquidity constraints on children’s school achievement in Vietnam. Chapter 3 shows the
theoretical and empirical analysis on the effect of liquidity constraints on engineer’s labor
market in U.S. Chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis on the effect of parents’ liquidity
constraints on children’s non-cognitive skills. Chapter 5 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Effect of Liquidity Constraints on
School Learning in Vietnam
2.1 Introduction
Liquidity constraints have been considered one of the most important factors that determine
human capital accumulation (Becker, 1975; Flug, Spilimbergo, and Wachtenheim, 1998).
Parents’ decisions about their children’s human capital accumulation depend on the liquidity
constraints faced by the parents. A household’s income may be vulnerable to many types
of shocks, such as extreme weather, disasters, and parents’ layoffs. If households cannot
insure their incomes against these shocks, they attempt to use other methods to smooth
their consumption in response to these shocks. In some cases, the investments in a child’s
human capital accumulation may decrease in order to smooth consumption. However, if
households are not liquidity constrained and so can borrow from various sources (e.g.,
formal and informal loans, loans from relatives, etc.), both their children’s human capital
accumulation and the households’ overall consumption might not be affected by income
shocks (Becker and Tomes, 1986; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997).
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The timing of liquidity constraints is another important determinant of children’s human
capital accumulation. Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2010) presented evidence that human
capital begins to develop at an early age. Self-productivity in human capital formulation
implies that early stocks of human capital determine later stocks of human capital.1 This
implies that parents’ investments during early childhood are important for developing a
child’s stock of human capital.
The link between liquidity constraints and educational investment has attracted the
attention of many scholars. Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Belley and Lochner (2007) mea-
sured the relationship between liquidity constraints and post-secondary schooling decisions
in the United States, and found negative effects of liquidity constraints. However, some
of those papers argue that the liquidity constraints’ effect on school enrollment disappears
when one controls for the ability and parental background (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002).
Only a few studies have measured the effect of liquidity constraints on school attendance in
the context of developing countries. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) found that income shocks
negatively affect children’s school attendances in India. Devicienti and Rossi (2013) found
that the income uncertainty combined with binding liquidity constraints has a negative
effect on the children’s schooling in Tanzania.
There are two challenges when estimating the causal effect of liquidity constraints on
children’s educational outcome. First, most studies measure liquidity constraints only indi-
rectly when investigating the effect of income shocks or external subsidies on human capital
investment (e.g., Keane and Wolpin (2001), Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) and Carneiro and
Heckman (2002)). Indirect methods detect liquidity constraints by looking for violations of
the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis (LC/PIH). The theoretical reasoning underly-
ing this approach is that “in the absence of liquidity and borrowing constraints, transitory
1Following Cunha and Heckman (2010), self productivity of human capital investment occurs when a
person’s skill in one stage of his or her life cycle is affected by his or her skill at previous stages of the life
cycle. This explains why investments in later stages of the life cycle are important to maintain and increase
the effect of earlier investments. The effect of an earlier investment may be reduced if the investments in
later stages are not sufficient. These two characteristics indicate that investments during the early stages of
a life cycle have a significant role in human capital investment.
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income shocks should not affect consumption” (p. 4, Diagne, Zeller, and Sharma (2000)).
The studies that use this indirect method estimate whether transitory income or income
shocks have a significant effect on economic behavior, such as savings (Rosenzweig and
Wolpin, 1993; Browning and Lusardi, 1996), entrepreneurial choice (Evans and Jovanovic,
1989), and investment in education (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow,
2009).
However, the indirect measures of the effect of constraints and the different assumptions
needed to use them may lead to mixed estimates of the effect of constraints (Stinebrick-
ner and Stinebrickner, 2008). Few studies try to directly measure liquidity constraints by
employing direct questions from surveys. Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998) defined a
household as being liquidity constrained when its credit request is turned down and/or it
does not have any credit cards.2 Feder et al. (1990) asked whether the farmers who bor-
rowed money want to obtain more money than they actually borrowed and defined a farmer
as liquidity constrained when a farmer answers, “Yes, I want to obtain more money.” How-
ever, few things are known about the direct measure of liquidity constraints and its effect
on education in developing countries context.3 Following the literature that uses direct
measurement, this chapter measures liquidity constraints directly using a specific question
from the Young Lives household questionnaires for Vietnam, as discussed in more detail
below.
The second challenge is potential bias due to the endogeneity of liquidity constraints.
Liquidity constraints may be endogenous due to the correlation between liquidity constraints
variable and error terms, such as parent’s ambition. Also, liquidity constraints may be
endogenous due to various factors such as individual characteristics, government policies,
2Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998) divided their liquidity constrained sample into three categories:
households who have experienced being turned down for a credit request; households without any credit
card or line of credit; and households who have been turned down for credit and have no credit card at the
same time.
3Devicienti and Rossi (2013) used the amount of durable goods and savings as proxies for liquidity
constraints. To see the effect of liquidity constraints when there is income uncertainty, they estimate the
effect of an interaction term between a dummy variable for durable goods (or savings) and variance in crop
loss. But Devicienti and Rossi (2013) do not directly measure the liquidity constraints of households.
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and weather conditions (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2002; Fitzsimons, 2007). To correct
for bias due to endogeneity, this chapter uses an instrumental variable (IV) approach, using
the following instruments for liquidity constraints: a dummy for the existence of close
relatives in the community; a dummy for the existence of subsidized credit programs in the
community; a dummy for savings cooperatives in the community; the interaction between
past rainfall volatility and father’s occupation; and the interaction between a current rainfall
shock and father’s occupation. These instrumental variables exploit information on the
financial environment of households and are not expected to have a direct effect on a child’s
human capital accumulation.
To examine the importance of timing in investment in children’s human capital, this
chapter estimates the effect of liquidity constraints at various stages of childhood on a
child’s human capital accumulation. The Young Lives data for Vietnam used in this chap-
ter were collected from 3,000 children (2,000 younger cohort children and 1,000 older cohort
children) over three rounds. Round 1 took place in 2002 (younger cohort children were 0–1
year old, while older cohort children were 7–8 years old), Round 2 was in 2006 (younger
cohort children were 4–5 years old, while older cohort children were 11–12 years old), and
Round 3 in 2009 (younger cohort children were 7–8 years old, while older cohort children
were 14–15 years old). Using these data, this chapter first estimates the effect of current
liquidity constraints on children’s educational outcomes. To see whether the timing of in-
vestment matters, the estimation is conducted using two rounds of surveys for two cohorts.4
In addition, the longitudinal data enable one to investigate the effect of liquidity constraints
in the early stages of childhood, which are thought to be critical for a child’s human capital
accumulation. By estimating the effect of liquidity constraints in early childhood on cog-
nitive skills as measured by test scores at a later age, this chapter searches for evidence of
the effect of liquidity constraints in early childhood on human capital accumulation.
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. First, it presents estimates
4The liquidity constraints variable is not measured in Round 1. So the analysis includes only Round 2
and Round 3
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for a developing country based on direct measures of liquidity constraints. Second, it con-
siders the potential bias caused by endogenous liquidity constraints, and uses instrumental
variables to reduce the bias. Finally, this chapter measures the effect of early liquidity con-
straints on later child human capital accumulation as well as the effect of current liquidity
constraints on human capital accumulation.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the educational
system in Vietnam. Section 2.3 develops a theoretical framework that relates liquidity con-
straints to children’s educational outcomes. Section 2.4 describes the Young Lives household
questionnaires for Vietnam and the rainfall data. Section 2.5 develops the empirical specifi-
cation. The estimation results are presented in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 summarizes
the results and suggests policy implications.
2.2 Background of the Educational System in Vietnam
The formal school system in Vietnam consists of five years in primary school, four years in
lower secondary school, and three years in high school. Children can enroll in pre-primary
schools before they are school-aged, but pre-primary education is not compulsory. Primary
education from the age of 6 to the age of 11 (grade 1 to grade 5) has been compulsory for
all children in Vietnam ever since the ‘Law on Universal Primary Education’ was adopted
in 1991, and so the primary education enrollment rate has increased to 100 percent in the
past two decades. The net primary school enrollment rate in Vietnam was 99 percent and
the primary completion rate was 100 percent in 2012 (World Bank, 2014b). Also, secondary
school enrollment and the secondary completion rate have dramatically increased since 1992.
In 2008–2012, the secondary school enrollment rate in Vietnam reached 78 percent for males
and 84 percent for females, which are almost threefold increases compared to figures from
1992 (UNICEF, 2014).
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The Vietnamese government has increased financial support for education over the past
decades. The share of education in the national budget increased from 7 percent to 20
percent between 1986 and 2008 (World Bank, 2011). Public spending on education was
6.3 percent of Vietnam’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010. That share is almost
twice the average share of spending on education in other Southeast Asian countries (World
Bank, 2014b). The main goals of the Vietnamese government’s education policies are to
expand school resources and to enhance the quality of education. These policies have been
successful, and both the quality and the quantity of education in Vietnam have increased
in recent decades.
However, it is still the case that students from disadvantaged backgrounds have lower
school achievement than students from advantaged backgrounds (e.g. Rolleston et al. (2013)
and World Bank (2011)). Concern is particulary high for the ethnic minority children in
the lowest income quintile who live in the rural areas. A second concern is the lack of time
for formal learning in primary schools. Even though the number of full-day primary schools
(FDS, at least 30 periods per week) has increased in the past few years, Vietnam has one
of the lowest hours of formal instruction among all developing countries (Rolleston et al.,
2013). In the Young Lives school survey for Vietnam, only 51 percent of head-teachers in
primary schools answered that their school offers FDS. Thus many students in Vietnam
spend only half a day or less in school. FDS can be helpful in enhancing the efficiency of
learning, especially for disadvantaged students.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
2.3.1 Parental Decisions on Child Investment
Caucutt and Lochner (2012) formulated a model to estimate the effect of the timing of
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liquidity constraints on human capital investment. The dynamic model, and their empirical
analysis using the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, suggest that a
dynamic complementarity exists between early and late investments, and that early invest-
ment plays a significant role in human capital accumulation. This chapter employs the
optimal life cycle investment model from Caucutt and Lochner (2012) for its theoretical
framework.
Suppose that there are three time periods. The childhood of an individual with an
initial ability to learn denoted by θ can be divided into early childhood (first period) and
late childhood (second period). Parents make decisions about consumption for all three
periods (c1, c2 and c3) and investments in child education for the first two periods (i1 and
i2 ). The child’s adult stock of skills in the third period, h3, is a function of child initial
ability to learn (θ) and early and late childhood investments (i1 and i2).
h3 = f(i1, i2, θ) (2.1)
The human capital production function in equation (2.1) is assumed to be concave and
increasing in i1 and i2. Assume also that ability and investment are complements, in other
words that f13 ≥ 0 and f23 ≥ 0.
The household’s utility depends on its consumption in all three periods (c1, c2, and c3).
Consumption after the first period is discounted at the rate of β. The main source of income
for the household when the child is in the school is parent’s income (y) and loans (a, where
a < 0). After the child grows up, the child contributes to household income through his
or her labor w(h3). Parents’ assets at the end of period t earn a gross return rate R, so
that assets at the beginning of period t+ 1 equal Rat. Parents can also borrow at the same
interest rate R, but there is a limit on the amount of debt that can carried over to the next
period (Lt).
11
The decision problem can be separated into two parts: during the childhood (period 1
and 2) where the investment occurs, and after the investment (period 3).
After childhood, the household earns income from the child with human capital h3 and
assets a3. The parents care only about consumption in this period,
5 so they maximize
their utility as: V3(a3, h3) = max
c3
u(c3). The budget constraints for period 3 is a4 = Ra3 +
w(h3)− c3. Since the asset in the fourth period is assumed to be zero (a4 = 0), the budget
constraints can be rewritten as Ra3 + w(h3) = c3.
During childhood that is period 1 and 2, the problem for parents is:
U = max
c1,c2,i1,i2,a3
u(c1) + βu(c2) + β
2V3(a3, f(i1, i2, θ)) (2.2)
subject to the budget constraints:
at+1 = Rat + yt − it − ct, for t = 1, 2, (2.3)
and the borrowing constraints:
at+1 ≥ −Lt, for t= 1, 2, (2.4)
Solving the first order conditions for consumption yields:
u′(c1) ≥ βRu′(c2) (2.5)
where the inequality is strict if and only if the borrowing constraints bind.
5The parents spend all money on consumption and paying back previous loans.
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Solving the first order conditions for investment and assuming interior solution simplifies
that:
u′(c1) = β2
∂V3(a3, h3)
∂h3
f1(i1, i2, θ)
u′(c2) = β
∂V3(a3, h3)
∂h3
f2(i1, i2, θ)
(2.6)
where ∂V3(a3,h3)∂h3 = wu
′(c3) > 0. The first order conditions indicate that the marginal rate
of substitution for consumption equals the technical rate of substitution in the production
of human capital:
f1(i1, i2, θ)
f2(i1, i2, θ)
=
u′(c1)
βu′(c2)
≥ R (2.7)
2.3.2 Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Child Investment
Solving the first of conditions for assets yields:
u′(c1) ≥ βRu′(c2) ≥ (βR)2u′(c3) (2.8)
Combining the first equations in (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8), we have:
u′(c1) ≤ β2wf1(u
′(c1)
(βR)2
) = u′(c1)wf1
1
R2
(2.9)
Equation (2.9) shows that f1 ≥ R2w , where the inequality is strict if any borrowing
constraints bind. With similar algebra, combining the second equation in (2.6), (2.7) and
(2.8), we have f2 ≥ Rw where the inequality is strict if any of borrowing constraints L2 binds.
Denote unconstrained optimal investments for human capital, given ability θ, by iu1(θ)
and iu2(θ). From equation f1 ≥ R
2
w and f2 ≥ Rw , those investments satisfy:
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f1(i
u
1(θ), i
u
2(θ), θ) =
R2
w
f2(i
u
1(θ), i
u
2(θ), θ) =
R
w
(2.10)
Equations in (2.10) indicate that the investment in child human capital is not affected
by income in the unconstrained case.
The following equations are derived from equation (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10):
f1(i
∗
1(θ), i
∗
2(θ), θ) > f1(i
u
1(θ), i
u
2(θ), θ) =
R2
w
, iff any borrowing constraints bind.
f2(i
∗
1(θ), i
∗
2(θ), θ) > f2(i
u
1(θ), i
u
2(θ), θ) =
R
w
, if the second period borrowing constraints binds.
(2.11)
The equations in (2.11) demonstrate that when there is a binding borrowing constraint
during early childhood (first time period), there is under-investment during the period
(i∗1 ≤ iu1). Also, when there is a borrowing constraint during the late childhood period
(second time period), both early and late investment will be less than the unconstrained
investment (i∗1 ≤ iu1 and i∗2 ≤ iu2).6
6Caucutt and Lochner (2012) provide the proof of this proposition in more detail. See Annex B in
Caucutt and Lochner (2012)
14
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Young Lives Household Survey Data for Vietnam
The Young Lives data for Vietnam are from a survey of 3,000 children, their households,
and their communities in Vietnam.7 The survey collects data on child health, daily ac-
tivity, his/her likes and dislikes, and school outcomes including test scores in language
comprehension and math. Household level data include information about parent’s educa-
tion, household composition, livelihood, savings, consumption, and access to several basic
services. The community level data include total population, infrastructure and services,
political representation, and community networks.
The survey collects data from two cohorts of children: 1,000 children born in 1994–95
(older cohort) and 2,000 children born in 2001–02 (younger cohort). Three rounds of data
have been collected thus far. Round 1 was carried out in 2002, when the younger cohort
of children were 6 to 19 months old and the older cohort of children were 7 to 8 years old.
Round 2 was implemented in 2006, when the younger cohort of children were 4 to 5 years
old and the older cohort of children were 11 to 12 years old. Round 3 took place in 2009,
when the younger cohort of children were 7 to 8 years old and the older cohort of children
were 14 to 15 years old. Round 4 is was implemented in 2013 (but the data are not yet
publicly available) and Round 5 is planned for 2016.
Measurement of Liquidity Constraints
This chapter employs direct measures of liquidity constraints. Liquidity constraints
can be defined as a situation where a person wants to borrow a certain amount of money
7The Young Lives data cover 12,000 children across four countries: Vietnam, Peru, India and Ethiopia
(www.younglives.org.uk). This chapter focuses on the Vietnam data. Young Lives is funded by the UK
Department for International Development (DFID) and was co-funded from 2014 to 2015 by Irish Aid. The
views expressed here are those of the author. They are not necessarily those of Young Lives, the University
of Oxford, DFID or other funders.
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but cannot borrow that amount from any sources (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2008;
Jappelli, 1990).8 The Young Lives household questionnaires for Vietnam include a question
on each household’s liquidity constraints. This chapter classifies a household as not liquidity
constrained if it answers “Yes” to following question:
 Question 1: Would your household be able to raise 300,000 VND (in Round 3, for
Round 2 the figure was 230,000 VND) in one week if you needed it? 9
 Answers : Yes / Probably / No
Child Achievement
This chapter measures children’s human capital accumulation by their test scores. The
model in Section 2.3 indicates that children’s human capital accumulation can be affected
by households’ liquidity constraints, which imply that those constraints will also affect
children’s test scores. Parents invest in their children in various ways, such as providing
nutritious foods, books, or tutors. Those investments should lead to higher child test scores.
The Young Lives data include several cognitive test scores:10 the Peabody Picture Vo-
8In contrast to liquidity constraints, a credit constrained household can be defined as a household that
cannot borrow a desired amount of cash from formal or informal lenders at a given interest rate. It includes
both borrowers who desire more credit than actually granted at the prevailing interest rate and households
who are completely unable to borrow (Feder et al., 1990). The cost to obtain a loan, for example the
interest rate and any required collateral, is an important and necessary components of the definition of
credit constraints. The literature on measuring credit constraints has considered constraints on both the
supply of and the demand for credit (Jappelli, 1990; Feder et al., 1990). A supply side credit constraint exists
when the lender imposes credit rationing or rejects the borrower’s loan application. Most of the literature on
credit constraints considers the supply side of credit constraints (e.g. Foltz (2004)). For demand side credit
constraints, the borrower wants to borrow only up to a certain amount of money at the prevailing interest
rate. The borrower does not want to pay a higher interest rate for more credit, so the credit constraint is
self-imposed.
9300,000 VND in 2009 was about 16.25 in 2009 USD. 230,000 VND in 2006 is about 14.94 in 2006 USD.
Vietnam’s GDP per capita in 2009 was 1,232 USD, and 797 USD in 2006. (Econstat.com) A study about the
average expenditure for middle school student in 2003 indicates that the school fees cost about 72,000 VND,
books cost 65,000 VND, and uniforms cost 53,100 VND. In addition to that, a middle school students spent
65,000 VND for books, 56,800 VND for other school materials, 107,500 VND for extra study, 66,700 for
other contributions, and 30,300 for other expenses. The total cost for a middle school student was 454,000
VND per month (London, 2011).
10For more details on tests used in Young Lives Study, see Cueto et al. (2009) and Cueto and Leon (2012)
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cabulary Test (PPVT), the Cognitive Development Assessment (CDA) and the Mathematics
Achievement test scores. In 2006 when Round 2 was implemented, the younger cohort chil-
dren were 4–5 years old and too young to take the Mathematics Achievement test. So they
took the CDA test instead. Thus the dependent variable varies by cohorts and by survey
round in this chapter. For the younger cohort the PPVT and CDA scores are used as the
dependent variables in Round 2, and the PPVT and Mathematics Achievement test are the
dependent variables in Round 3. The PPVT and Mathematics Achievement test are the
dependent variables for both rounds for the older cohort.
The PPVT measures a child’s level of vocabulary. The test is designed to select a
picture that is the correct response to a stimulus word spoken by a presenter (Cueto and
Leon, 2012). There are 204 items in total, and each child gets 1 point when he or she selects
a correct picture, so one can score from 0 to 204. In the Young Lives sample, the PPVT
ranges between 13 to 163 for the older cohort, and from 5 to 132 for the younger cohort in
Round 2. In Round 3, the range is between 46 to 201 for the older cohort and from 27 to
180 for the younger cohort.
The format of the Mathematics Achievement test differs by cohort and by round. In
Round 2, only the older cohort took the math test. The test consists of 10 items which
measure the number sense of child. The child gets 1 points when they write correct answer
for a given item. So the math test in Round 2 can take values from 0 to 10, and in the
Young Lives sample scores vary between 0 and 9.
In Round 3, both cohorts took the Mathematics Achievement test but the test format
was different by cohort. The younger cohort had 30 items in the Mathematics Achievement
test: 10 items to measure counting skills and knowledge of numbers etc, and 20 items
on basic calculation such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. The older
cohort were given 30 items in total: 20 items on basic calculations including square roots
and 10 items on mathematics problem solving (Cueto and Leon, 2012). The older cohort
selected in this chapter have math scores between 0 to 30, and the younger cohort have
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math scores between 0 to 29, in Round 3.
Instead of the Mathematics Achievement test, the younger cohort took the CDA test
in Round 2. The original CDA was developed by the International Evaluation Association
(IEA) and has several sub-sections on spatial relations, quantity, and time. The Young
Lives survey data administered only the quantity section, which is designed to have the
child select pictures that match verbal statement spoken by a presenter. The statements
are related to basic concepts on quantity: e.g. few, more, nothing (Cueto and Leon, 2012).
There are 15 items in total, and the younger cohort had scores from 0 to 14.
Individual and household characteristics
The Young Lives household questionnaires for Vietnam collected abundant information
on child and household characteristics. To measure the causal effect of liquidity constraints
on child educational outcomes, the specification in following section includes individual char-
acteristics of the child and household such as the child’s sex and age, the mother’s education,
the father’s education, household income, a dummy variable for rural area, household size,
and the child’s body mass index (BMI).11
This chapter excludes children a who did not participate in any of two survey rounds
(Round 2 and 3), or who have missing data for variables of individual characteristics or
for test scores. Among 3,000 children in the survey, 56 children are dropped since they do
not appear at least one round (0 younger cohort and 56 older cohort). 159 children are
dropped since they miss community information (24 older cohort and 135 younger cohort).
412 children of the rest do not have at least one of the test scores (325 for younger cohort,
87 for older cohort). Then 49 children in younger cohort and 44 children in older cohort
11The children’s weight for height/length Z-score is used more often then the BMI score. However, the
Young Lives data for Vietnam have many missing data in the weight for height/length Z-score. The analysis
using the weight for height/length instead of BMI score shows similar evidences but with smaller sample
size. The author decided to use BMI score instead of the weight for height/length Z-score to have larger
sample size in the analysis.
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are dropped because of missing data in Rounds 2 and 3. So the total number of sampled
children is 1,456 for the younger cohort and 812 for the older cohort.
The summary statistics for the key variables separately by liquidity constraint status,
are reported in Table 2.1. The first and second columns show the means and standard
deviations of these variables for all children in the sample. The next two columns report
the means and standard deviations of variables for children from non-liquidity constrained
households, that is those who answered “Yes, I can raise 300,000 VND (in Round 3, for
Round 2 the figure was 230,000 VND) if I need it” to the question 1 in Section 2.4. Means
and standard deviations of variables for children from households who answer that they can
“probably” can raise money, and those from children from households who said that they
“cannot” raise money are reported in the following columns.
For both cohorts and both rounds, the test scores of children from non-liquidity con-
strained households are higher than those of children from liquidity constrained households.
There are also some differences across the sub-samples in other individual characteristics.
For example, children from non-liquidity constrained household has more educated fathers
and mothers and higher household incomes.
2.4.2 Rainfall Data
The rainfall data used in this chapter are from Thomas et al. (2010). The original rainfall
data are from Vietnam’s Hydro-meterological Data Center, which collects daily precipitation
from 172 weather stations in Vietnam. Thomas et al. (2010) provided clean rainfall data
between 1976 and 2006 on the World Bank website.12 The rainfall data for 2007–2009 are
from Global Climate Resource Page at University of Delaware.13 Using the longitudes and
12The data can be downloaded at the following link: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:22820840~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:
469382,00.html$
13The data can be downloaded at : http://climate.geog.udel.edu/~climate/
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latitudes of weather stations, and those of the sample villages in the Young Lives survey for
Vietnam, this chapter matches the nearest weather station to each village. The matched
weather stations are all within 50 km of the sample villages.
This chapter calculates past rainfall volatility between 1979 and 1993 to instrument
current liquidity constraints. The original data cover rainfall from 1976, but there are many
missing values in the rainfall data from 1976 to 1978. Past rainfall volatility should have
no direct effect on children’s current human capital accumulation. The sample children
in the Young Lives data for Vietnam were born in the years 1994 to 1995 (older cohort
children) and 2001 to 2002 (younger cohort children). Fitzsimons (2007) indicated that
rainfall before children are born does not have a direct effect on households’ investment
decisions on children’s human capital accumulation.14 So this chapter uses rainfall data
between 1979 and 1993 to calculate past rainfall volatility. Rainfall between 1979 and 1993
should not have direct impact on the sample children’s human capital accumulation since
the oldest child in the Young Lives household questionnaires for Vietnam was born in 1994.
This chapter calculates past rainfall volatility following Fitzsimons (2007). Rainfall
volatility can be measured in the ways by variation within the season and the variation
between seasons. This chapter divides the daily records of precipitation into two periods, wet
season and dry season, for each year between 1979 and 1993. Vietnam is a “bamboo pole”
shaped country that is long and narrow from the north to the south. The country exhibits
regional differences in weather: the wet and dry seasons differ by region. Vietnam has
eight regions: Northwest, Northeast, Red River Delta, North Central Coast, South Central
Coast, Central Highlands, Southeast, and Mekong River Delta. Among the 34 villages in
the Young Lives household survey for Vietnam, seven are located in the Northeast, seven
are in the Mekong River Delta, and seven are in the Red River Delta region. The remaining
13 are located in the South Central Coast region. The Northeast, the Mekong River Delta,
and the Red River Delta regions have the wet season from May through October and the
14For more identification assumptions of using past rainfall volatility as instrumental variable, please see
Section 2.5.
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dry season starting in November and ending in April. The South Central Coast region
has wet and dry seasons that are different from those in other regions: its wet season is
from October to December and the dry season is from January to September. This chapter
calculates (a) the coefficient of variation of rainfall over time for each village, and in each of
the two seasons; and (b) the ratio of average rainfall during the wet season to that during
the dry season. The first instrumental variable captures the variation in rainfall in the
village within the season, and the second one measures the spread of rainfall between the
two seasons, in each village.
Following Fitzsimons (2007), this chapter presents two figures showing the variation and
dispersion of rainfall. Figure 2.1 displays the log of the ratio of mean rainfall during the
wet season to that during the dry season. It shows that there is a wide dispersion in rainfall
across the regions. Figure 2.2 shows the log of standard deviations of rainfall by season. It
indicates that the wet season has higher rainfall and more variation in rainfall compared to
the dry season.
This chapter uses rainfall shocks as instruments the liquidity constraints. Following the
rainfall shocks calculation method of Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), this chapter calculates
(a) the deviation of the current season’s rainfall from the average, and (b) the square of the
deviation of the current season’s rainfall from the average. The average rainfall is calculated
using precipitation data from 1979 to 2006. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) indicated that the
current rainfall deviation from the average captures the information about the income shocks
of the household.15
This rainfall volatility and rainfall shocks are interacted with the fathers’s occupation.
Rainfall may affect liquidity constraints differently by occupation: farmer’s liquidity con-
straints are likely to be more elastic to rainfall than that of business owner in the non-
15There are two types of rainfall shocks: positive and negative rainfall shocks. This chapter runs two
specification: one with negative rainfall shocks, and another one with both type of shocks. There are no
significant difference between two results, so following empirical analysis section reports only the result using
negative rainfall shocks.
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agricultural sector (Fitzsimons, 2007; Townsend, 1994). Thus, this chapter divides the
father’s occupation into seven categories: self-employed in the agricultural sector, wage-
employed in the agricultural sector, other in the agricultural sector, self-employed in the
non-agricultural sector, wage-employed in the non-agricultural sector, other in the non-
agricultural sector, and unemployed. The dummy of each category is interacted with rain-
fall volatility and shocks.
2.5 Methodology
2.5.1 Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Children’s Test Scores using Or-
dinary Least Squares Analysis
This chapter first estimates the effect of current liquidity constraints on children’s current
stock of human capital, as measured by scores on achievement tests. To do this, the following
specification is proposed:
yi,h,c,t = αLh,c,t +
I∑
i=1
βiXi,h,c,t + τc + εi,h,c,t (2.12)
where yi,h,c,t is the educational outcome (test score) of child i from household h in community
c at period t. Lh,c,t is liquidity constraints variable and it includes three dummy variables:
first one indicates the households answers “ Yes” to Question 1 in Section 2.4, second one
indicates when the answer is “Probably”, and equals three when the answer is “No”. The
Xi variables are the characteristics of the child and his or her household, such as sex, age,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s religion, household income, rural or urban
residence, household size, and the child’s BMI (weight over height squared) when he or she
was first surveyed (when the younger cohort was 6 to 19 months old and the older cohort
was 7-8 years old). The variable τc allows for community-specific fixed effects and εi,h,c,t is
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an error term. The error term includes the unobserved characteristics and preferences that
have effect on human capital investment.
The model of human capital accumulation in Section 2.3 suggests that liquidity con-
straints at a young age may reduce the child’s human capital investment in later ages.
To measure the effect of past liquidity constraints on later child achievement, a more
general specification can be applied:
yi,h,c,t = αLh,c,t−1 + βLh,c,t +
I∑
i=1
γiXi,h,c,t−1 + τc + εi,h,c,t (2.13)
This specification includes early liquidity constraints, LCh,c,t−1.16
2.5.2 Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Children’s Test Scores using Two
Stage Least Squares Analysis
OLS estimates of equation (2.12) and (2.13), however, may yield biased estimates since
liquidity constraints are unlikely to be randomly assigned. In this case, the liquidity con-
straint variables in equation (2.12) and (2.13) are likely to be correlated with the error
terms in each equation, in which case the OLS estimates will produce inconsistent results
(Wooldridge, 2010). In general, the survey data find difficult to observe variables such as
risk aversion or parent’s preference that may have significant effects on child human capital
investment. If risk aversion has a positive effect on child education, and risk aversion and
liquidity constraints are positively correlated, the estimated effect of liquidity constraints is
upward biased.
To avoid the potential bias from such endogenous variables, social scientists have widely
16To avoid the potential problem of correlation between Lh,c,t−1 and Lh,c,t, I empirically measured the
same specification as equation (2.13) but without Lh,c,t. The result is presented in the Appendix.
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used two stage least squares (Instrumental variables) analysis. This section explains how
the two stage least squares analysis is implemented.
This chapter uses a question in Young Lives household questionnaires for Vietnam to
measure the liquidity constraints of households. In the sample, 52 percent of households in
Round 2 and 41 percent in Round 3 answer that they can raise that amount of money in a
week when they face risk.
A question about the source of money followed the liquidity constraints question, if a
household answers “Yes, I can raise the money”. Among the households who answer in
Round 2 that they can raise money in a week, about 39.2 percent answer that they will
get the money from relatives or friends in the community, while only 3 percent say they
will get it from formal loan and 4 percent answer that they will use savings. In Round 3,
the percent of households who answer that the money will come from relatives or friends in
community is even higher, 50 percent, while the percent who say that they would obtain a
formal loan drops to 1 percent. The households who would use their savings increases to
20.7 percent in Round 3. Only a few households answer that they will raise money from
micro finance (0.3 percent in Round 2 and 0.1 percent in Round 3).
The answers to this question on the source of funds indicates that many households
are relying on relatives or friends in their local community when they face risk. Also,
savings accounts appear to have an increasing role over time as a mechanism to overcome
households’ liquidity constraints. Even though the percentage of people relying on micro
finance and formal loans is low, the existence of a micro finance or credit programs in the
community may also affect households’ liquidity constraints.17 This chapter argues that
liquidity constraints may be endogenous in the sense that they depend on the existence
of relatives, credit programs, and financial institutions such as savings cooperative in the
community.
17The portion of households who say they will use loans (including both formal and informal loans) or
micro finance is slightly higher in community with credit program (10 percent) than that in community
without credit program (6 percent).
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Other instrumental variables are past rainfall volatility and rainfall shocks, both in-
teracted with the father’s occupational category. Those two variables try to capture the
predicted risk factor and unanticipated shocks for households, respectively. Past rainfall
volatility provides information about the risky environment of village. The riskiness of vil-
lage may have an effect on the assets of household and its liquidity constraints. Fitzsimons
(2007) indicates that the interaction with occupation and past rainfall volatility may ex-
plain whether the household is exposed to the risk of weather volatility. Households that
rely on the agricultural sector may be exposed more to the weather risk than households in
the non-agricultural sector. This chapter argues that households who are exposed to riskier
environments are more likely to be liquidity constrained.
Rainfall shocks capture information about unanticipated weather and its effect on house-
hold liquidity constraint status. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) present evidence showing village
level rainfall “surprises” explain the unanticipated income shocks and liquidity constraints
of households. The shocks are not expected to directly affect children’s human capital ac-
cumulation, but have an indirect effect through household’s income shocks and liquidity
constraints.
Using these instrumental variables, the first stage equation for equations (2.12) and
(2.13) is specified as follows:
Lh,c,t =
I∑
i=1
γCOMIVi,c,t +
I∑
i=1
δHHIVi,h,c,t + +
I∑
i=1
θiXi,h,c,t + ζc + εi,h,c,t (2.14)
where Lh,c,t is liquidity constraints variable, which is categorical variable: one indicates that
household answers “Yes,”, two indicates that household answers “Probably,” and three indi-
cates that household answers “No,” to Question 1 in Section 2.4. COMIVc,t are community
level instrumental variables such as a dummy for the existence of subsidized credit programs
and a dummy for the existence of savings cooperatives in the community. HHIVh,c,t are
household level instrumental variables such as a dummy for the existence of relatives in com-
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munity, the interaction between past rainfall and father’s occupation, and the interaction
between rainfall shocks and father’s occupation. The variable ζc allows for community-
specific fixed effects and εi,h,c,t is an error term.
The main concern of using instrumental variables is whether they are valid instruments.
As explained in Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Wooldridge (2010), there are two required
conditions for a valid instrumental variable. First, the instrumental variable should have a
statistically significant effect on the endogenous variable, conditional on all other variables
in the equation of interest. This assumption can be tested by examining the first stage and
it’s F-statistics. I report and discuss about the result of first stage in Section 6.
The second requirement of an instrumental variable is that it should not have a causal
impact on the dependent variable in the equation of interest after conditioning on the
explanatory variables in that equation (exclusion restriction). This implies that it should not
be correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. Fitzsimons (2007) presented
evidence showing that past rainfall variability in Indonesia is exogenous to educational
choices in the future. This chapter also conducts over-identification test to see whether
the instrumental variables are valid, and most of the specifications in this chapter pass the
over-identification test.
In addition, this chapter conducts weak instrumental variable test. Bound, Jaeger, and
Baker (1995) suggest to use a “fake” instrument and compare the result with TSLS analy-
sis. The result of TSLS using “fake” instrumental variable is reported in Table A1 in the
Appendix. The estimation result for the younger and older cohorts children in Round 2 is
very different from the original IV results in Table 2.8, and it tells us that the instrumental
variables used in this chapter are valid.
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 OLS Estimates of the Effect of Current Liquidity Constraints on
Children’s Current Test Scores using OLS
The OLS estimates of equation (2.12), which measure the effect of current liquidity con-
straints on children’s test scores, are presented in Table 2.2 (younger cohort in Round 2),
Table 2.3 (older cohort in Round 2), Table 2.4 (younger cohort in Round 3), and Table 2.5
(older cohort in Round 3).
The liquidity constraints variable has three possible values. The first indicates that the
household can raise 230,000 VND (Round 2) or 300,000 VND (Round 3) in one week, the
second indicates that households can “probably” raise that amount of money, and the third
is that households “cannot” raise the money. To see the effect of liquidity constraints on
children’s test scores, the first category is omitted in the regression. The coefficients for the
variables “probably can raise” and “cannot raise” in Table 2.2–2.5 show whether liquidity
constraints increase or decrease children’s test scores. All test scores are standardized.
As seen in Table 2.2, OLS estimates indicate that current liquidity constraints nega-
tively affect PPVT and CDA scores for the younger cohort in Round 2 when the younger
cohort children were 4–5 years old. Even after controlling for individual characteristics and
community fixed effects, the negative effect is robust. Liquidity constraints decrease chil-
dren’s PPVT test scores by about 0.036 standard deviations and CDA scores by about 0.215
standard deviations (columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.2). The younger cohort’s test scores are
negatively affected by current liquidity constraints in Round 3 as well, when they were 7–8
years old. Liquidity constraints lower children’s PPVT scores by 0.126 standard deviations
and Mathematics Achievement test scores by 0.262 standard deviations (column 2 and 4 of
Table 2.4).
However, as seen in Tables 2.3 and 2.5, the effect of liquidity constraints on the older
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cohort’s test scores is not consistent. Child’s test score for the household who answered
“Probably can raise the money” is higher than unconstrained children by 0.0567 standard
deviations, when older cohort were 11–12 years old (Column 2 in Table 2.3). Also there is
positive effect from liquidity constraints on older cohort’s PPVT score when older cohort
were 14–15 years old (Column 1 in Table 2.5). However, there is no significant effect
from liquidity constraint (“Can not raise the money”) after one controls for individual
characteristics and community fixed effects (Column 2 in Table 2.5).
The results indicate that liquidity constraints have significant effects on younger chil-
dren. The younger cohort were aged 4 to 5 in Round 2 and aged 7 to 8 in Round 3. The
liquidity constraints lower the younger cohort’s test scores in both rounds. However, the
older cohort children were aged 11 to 12 in Round 2, and 14 to 15 when Round 3 was imple-
mented, and their test scores were not severely affected by households’ liquidity constraints.
One possible explanation is that liquidity constraint has more effect for children in their
early stage of life. The critical time for developing human capital may be 0–5 years old,
and the liquidity constraint has severe effect on human capital development at that time
(or early elementary school age). The liquidity constraint is more “out of date” for older
cohort when they were aged 11–12 and 14–15.
2.6.2 OLS Estimates of Dynamic Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Test
Scores using OLS
Table 2.6 presents OLS estimates of the effect of early liquidity constraints on later test
scores (equation (2.13)). The younger cohort in Panel A of the table were 4 to 5 years old
in Round 2 when the information about liquidity constraints was collected. The PPVT and
math tests were taken in Round 3, when these children were 7 to 8 years old. Column (3)
for younger cohort suggests that the liquidity constraints when children were 4 to 5 years
old decrease their math test scores three years later by 0.18 standard deviations. This result
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is smaller and not statistically significant, however, when community fixed effects are added
to the regression.
The results in Panel B in Table 2.6 show analogous results for the older cohort children.
The older cohort children were 11 to 12 years old when the liquidity constraints information
was collected and were 14 to 15 years old when the PPVT and math tests were taken. The
results are mixed. The liquidity constraints when children were 11-12 years old decrease
children’s PPVT scores by 0.193 standard deviations after three years (column 1 for Panel B
in Table 2.6). The effect is smaller and not significant, however, when the community fixed
effects are added. What’s interesting to observe in this table is that the variable “cannot
raise in Round 3” increases the older cohort’s test scores by 0.09 standard deviations (column
1 for Panel B in Table 2.6). However the positive effect diminish when community fixed
effect is added.
One can argue that the liquidity constraints in Rounds 2 and 3 may be strongly corre-
lated with each other. The collinearity, caused by strong correlation between two indepen-
dent variables, increases the standard error of the coefficients. It can cause the coefficient of
a variable not to be statistically significant. To deal with this issue, this chapter conducts
same analysis as Table 2.6 but without the liquidity constraints variable in Round 3. Table
A2 in the Appendix presents the result of analysis using only the liquidity constraints in
Round 2. The effect of liquidity constraints for Round 2 in Table 2.6 and in Table A2
are mostly the same: the liquidity constraints in Round 2 decreases the younger cohort’s
Math test score by 0.195 standard deviations and the older cohort’s PPVT score by 0.188
standard deviations (Table A3).
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2.6.3 Instrumental Variables Estimates
Table 2.7 presents estimates of the determinants of liquidity constraints for the younger
cohort in Round 2.18 These are the first stage results for the IV estimates in Table 2.8
and 2.9 of the effect of liquidity constraints on children’s human capital accumulation. The
dependent variable in the first stage is the liquidity constraint status of a household. The
liquidity constraint variable is a categorical variable : one is for “can raise the money,” two
is for “probably can raise the money,” and three is for “can not raise the money.” This
table shows only the coefficients for the instrumental variables; the other variables included
in the human capital equation (e.g., age, sex, and father’s education etc.) are excluded.
Specification A includes a dummy for the existence of relatives, a dummy for the existence
of subsidized credit programs, and a dummy for the existence of a savings cooperative as
the instrumental variables. Specification B adds past rainfall volatility and the interaction
of past rainfall volatility and occupation to specification A. Specification C adds rainfall
shocks and the interaction of rainfall shocks and occupation, but excluded past rainfall
volatility. Finally, specification D includes all instrumental variables: a dummy for the
existence of relatives, a dummy for the existence of subsidized credit programs, a dummy
for the existence of a savings cooperative, past rainfall volatility and its interaction with
occupation, and rainfall shocks and its interaction with occupation.
The first column of each specification (columns 1, 3, 4, and 7) include child and household
characteristics as regressor but exclude community fixed effects. The second column of each
specification (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8) include both individual and household characteristics
and community fixed effects. F-statistics at the bottom of the table indicate whether
variables in the first stage significantly estimate the liquidity constraints variable.
Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) persuasively argue that there are two problems when
18Table 2.7 shows the first stage result of the determinants of liquidity constraints only for the younger
cohort in Round 2. The results are very similar for older cohort children in Round 2 and for both cohorts
in Round 3.
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using weak instruments: inconsistency and finite sample bias. The first problem is that
weak instruments may lead to inconsistency in IV estimates if the instrumental variables
are correlated with the error term in the second stage; for example, if the existence of a
credit program in the community is related to the error term in the second stage, then the
estimated endogenous variables will be correlated with the error term. In this case, the IV
estimator will be inconsistent. The extent of the inconsistency depends on how much the
instrumental variable predicts the endogenous variable. So the weaker the instrument, the
larger the inconsistency.
The second problem discussed by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) is finite sample bias.
Even if the instrumental variables are not correlated with the error term, weak instrumental
variables can lead to bias when the sample is finite. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) showed
that low F-statistics (close to one) in the first stage means that the bias using IV estimates
is almost as large as the bias in the OLS estimates. However, a large F-statistic in the first
stage means that bias in IV estimates is much smaller than that in OLS estimates.
The F-test of the first stage regression can be used to check for finite sample bias. Stock
and Yogo (2005) suggested that the first stage F-statistics should be above five to avoid
biased results when there is one endogenous variable and multiple, but weak, instrumental
variables.
The F-statistics for specifications A, B, and C imply that the instrumental variables are
not valid when the community fixed effects are included in the analysis. The F-statistics
without the community fixed effects are either above or around five. But the F-statistics
are far lower when community fixed effects are added. Specification D, which includes all
instrumental variables, has F-statistics below the critical points even without community
fixed effect. Thus specification D has a weak instrumental variable problem.19
19The P-value of over-identification test is 0. for Specification D, however, which indicates that there is
no exclusion restriction problem in Specification D. However, since it has low R-squared, the estimators in
Specification D is not reliable.
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The rest of this section considers specifications A, B, and C without the community
fixed effects and compares the IV estimation results with those of OLS. The OLS results
throughout Table 2.6 tell us that community fixed effect are important since adding com-
munity fixed effects changes the size of effect or the significant level of it. Ideally, the IV
estimation with community fixed effects will give us the most unbiased estimation of liquid-
ity constraints effect. However, the very low F-statistics for the first stage of IV estimation
with community fixed effects implies that those estimates are not reliable. The community
fixed effects are used to control for the socio-economic status of the community. The in-
strumental variables used in this chapter also capture the information of the community.
The rainfall volatility and rainfall shocks are measured at the community level, and they
include information on whether the community has been exposed to the risk from weather
shocks in the past, and currently. The information about the existence of savings coopera-
tives and credit programs also tells us about the existence of financial infrastructure in the
community. In addition, to see whether the community fixed effect makes large differences
in the OLS analysis, this chapter conducts a Hausman-type test, checking the consistency
between two OLS analyses: one without community fixed effects and one with community
fixed effects for younger cohorts in Round 2.20 The P-value of the test is 0.166, so one can-
not reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the estimates without community
fixed effects and the estimates with community fixed effects are identified. This suggests
that it is reasonable to consider only the estimates without community fixed effects.
The first-stage equation indicates that the existence of subsidized credit programs in
the community decreases the possibility that the household is liquidity constrained. In
contrast, the existence of a savings cooperative increases the possibility of the household
to be liquidity constrained. The existence of relatives in the community has no significant
effect on whether a household is liquidity constrained. Rainfall volatility in wet season has
negative effect on households’ liquidity constraints. The higher the coefficient of variation
20The Hausman-type test is a generalized type of Hausman test. The original Hausman test does not
allow for clustering. The generalized version, however, adjust for clustering. For more details about the
Hausman-type test, please see Hausman (1978) and Weesie (2000).
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in wet season (1979-1993), the higher the probability that household answer “cannot raise
the money.” The effect is different depending on the father’s occupation: there are more
possibility for wage worker in the agricultural sector than self-employed worker in the agri-
cultural sector to be liquidity constrained when there is rainfall volatility. Rainfall shocks
have a negative effect on household liquidity constraints (Column 5 and 7 in Table 2.7): the
greater the deviation of rainfalls in wet season were find, the higher the probability that
the household is liquidity constrained, even though it is not significant in Column 5. This
is what one would expect; households that face greater risks would have more difficulty
obtaining credit and other sources of funds.
IV estimates of the effect of current liquidity constraints on children’s current test scores
are presented in Table 2.8. The estimated effects of liquidity constraints on the test scores
of the younger cohort children in Round 2 are negative and significant. Liquidity con-
straints decrease the younger cohort children’s PPVT and math test scores by 0.536 and
2.117 standard deviations, respectively, in specification A. The negative effect of liquidity
constraints is consistent in specification B: liquidity constraints decrease the younger cohort
children’s PPVT and math test scores by 0.181 and 0.953 standard deviations. The results
are similar in specification C. The estimated effects of liquidity constraints on the older
cohort children’s test scores are not significant and in some cases are even positive (PPVT
score in Specifications A and B for older cohort Round 2). Recalling the OLS estimation
results for older cohorts in Round 2 (Tables 2.2 and 2.3), these results are consistent with
the OLS analysis that only younger cohort’s non-cognitive skills are negatively affected by
liquidity constraints.
In Round 3, the effect of liquidity constraints is mixed. The younger cohort’s PPVT
score is negatively affected by liquidity constraints in Specification A (Column 1 in Table
2.8), while there is also positive effect from liquidity constraints on younger cohort’s Math
score (Column 2) and older cohort’s PPVT and Math score (Columns 3 and 4).
Table 2.9 presents the effect of liquidity constraints in Round 2 on children’s test scores
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three years later in Round 3. The results indicate that liquidity constraints in the early
stage of childhood have a negative effect on children’s test scores in the later stage only for
younger cohort. The size of the effect for the younger cohort children is 0.3–0.5 standard
deviations. The effect is not statistically significant for older cohort. Again this result in-
dicate that the liquidity constraints for older cohort when they were 11–12 years old may
be “out of date,” and does not affect child’s human capital development.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines the effect of liquidity constraints on children’s cognitive skills, as
measured by test scores, in Vietnam. Theory suggests that children’s human capital ac-
cumulation depends on parents’ liquidity constraints: parents may underinvest in a child’s
human capital when they face liquidity constraints. The timing of a child’s human capital
investment matter, because human capital begins to develop in early childhood, and early
human capital directly affects later production of human capital. By examining the effect of
liquidity constraints on children’s cognitive test scores at different ages, this chapter searches
for evidence of the effect of liquidity constraints on children’s human capital accumulation
and the importance of timing in child human capital investment.
To overcome the potential bias from OLS estimates, this chapter employs IV estimates
using several instrumental variables: past rainfall volatility, rainfall shocks, a dummy for
the existence of relatives in the community, a dummy for the existence of subsidized credit
programs in the community, and a dummy for the existence of a savings cooperative in the
community. Those instrumental variables exploit information about the financial environ-
ment of the household.
The first stage analysis tells us that the existence of subsidized credit programs decreases
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the possibility of household being liquidity constrained. The rainfall volatility affects liq-
uidity constraints differently depending on the household’s income source. The interaction
of rainfall volatility with the father’s occupation shows a larger effect when the rainfall is
interacted with the wage worker in agricultural sector. Rainfall shocks weakly predict the
liquidity constraints of a household, but it has negative effect on the status of liquidity
constraints.
Results suggest that children’s cognitive test scores are negatively affected by liquidity
constraints. The empirical results using both the OLS and IV estimates indicate that liq-
uidity constraints decrease children’s test scores. The size of effect and the significance level
is different by child’s age in both OLS and IV estimates. Liquidity constraint lower younger
cohort children’s test score by 0.1–0.3 standard deviations in Round 3, while the effect was
not significant for older cohort children with OLS. The IV results tell us that liquidity con-
straints lower younger cohort children’s test scores by 0.3–0.9 standard deviations, but do
not have any significant and consistent effect on older cohort children’s test scores.
The overall result presented in this chapter is consistent with other literature that
emphasizes the importance of liquidity constraints on human capital investment, such as
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Devicienti and Rossi (2013). The difference in the effect
of liquidity constraints on human capital by a child’s age is supported by the literature,
which shows the importance of early investment to enhance human capital accumulation.
For example, Brooks-Gunn and Duncan (1997) presented empirical evidence that a fam-
ily’s income during a child’s early age (preschool and early school years) has a significant
effect on the child’s cognitive skills, and Heckman (2000) showed that education during
early childhood has a high internal rate of return. Other papers indicate the effectiveness of
programs that subsidize poor families so that they invest in their children’s human capital
(Currie and Thomas, 2000; Campbell et al., 2008; Heckman et al., 2010; Reynolds et al.,
2011).
The evidence found in this chapter has an important implication for future studies on
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Vietnam’s educational policy. Since education is one of the growth engines for developing
countries (Lucas, 1988; Glewwe, 2002; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008), policies to enhance
education should be a priority in developing countries. Vietnam, as one of the fastest
growing developing countries in the world, has also implemented various educational policies
in order to increase student learning. Most government policies in Vietnam to increase
education focus on the supply side. These policies include training teachers, improving
school resources and facilities, and supporting full-day-schooling (FDS) and early childhood
programs (World Bank, 2011). However, there are few interventions on the demand side
of education. The World Bank (2011) indicated that tuition fees for secondary school and
indirect schooling costs, such as uniforms, transportation, tutoring, boarding costs etc., are
the main obstacle for Vietnamese households to increase children’s education. As seen in
the first stage analysis of this chapter, the existence of subsidized credit programs in the
community lowers the probability that a household is liquidity constrained, and it indirectly
affects students’ learning. Thus, policy-makers should consider programs that provide an
appropriate intervention to reduce households’ liquidity constraints in order to increase
student learning. This chapter shows that the negative effect of liquidity constraints’ on
children’s human capital is largest when children are younger. The effect is smaller or not
significant for older children. This suggests that credit programs that ease households’
liquidity constraints should target those with young children to maximize their impact on
student learning.
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2.8 Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.1: Kernel Density Estimates of Log of Ratio of Mean Rainfall in Wet Season to
that in Dry Season
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38
Figure 2.2: Kernel Density Estimates of Log of Standard Deviation of rainfall by season
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Table 2.2: OLS Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Child Test Score in Round
2 (Younger cohort)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PPVT PPVT CDA CDA
Liquidity Constraints
Probably can raise -0.0337* -0.0152 -0.201*** -0.0752
(0.0187) (0.0144) (0.0646) (0.0496)
Cannot raise -0.0622** -0.0368* -0.408*** -0.215***
(0.0269) (0.0196) (0.109) (0.0717)
Individual Covariates
Age in months 0.0165*** 0.0173*** 0.0467*** 0.0376***
(0.00302) (0.00225) (0.00810) (0.00605)
Female 0.0156 0.0209 -0.0121 0.00359
(0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0508) (0.0518)
Mother’s education level(yrs) 0.0178*** 0.0165*** 0.0341** 0.0377***
(0.00396) (0.00322) (0.0153) (0.00872)
Father’s education level(yrs) 0.00940*** 0.0119*** 0.0329*** 0.0316***
(0.00294) (0.00244) (0.00925) (0.00664)
Mother’s religion is catholic 0.123 0.0918 -0.0254 -0.0247
(0.0849) (0.0676) (0.222) (0.158)
buddism -0.00717 -0.000304 -0.0713 0.00173
(0.0302) (0.0202) (0.0956) (0.104)
protestant 0.0806* 0.0475 -0.0336 -0.107
(0.0460) (0.0681) (0.215) (0.165)
Cao Dai -0.133 -0.0656 -0.373 -0.00465
(0.0876) (0.0852) (0.229) (0.230)
Hoa Hao -0.132*** -0.0476** 0.274* 0.110
(0.0361) (0.0215) (0.137) (0.0854)
Household size -0.00731 -0.00192 -0.0440* -0.00282
(0.00565) (0.00490) (0.0220) (0.0151)
Live in rural -0.184*** 0.0281 -0.270** -0.0898
(0.0512) (0.0572) (0.118) (0.186)
BMI -0.000499 -0.00503 -0.00921 -0.00528
(0.00462) (0.00482) (0.0159) (0.0139)
Total income (mil. VND) 0.891*** 0.511*** 2.123** 0.878**
(0.232) (0.147) (0.848) (0.426)
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456
R-squared 0.293 0.437 0.206 0.424
Notes: 1. Liquidity Constraints : “Can raise 230,000 VND” is the omitted category. 2.
Test scores are standardized. 3.Standard errors clustered within village in parentheses.
*** p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table 2.3: OLS Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Child Test Score in Round
2 (Older cohort)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PPVT PPVT Math Math
Liquidity Constraints
Probably can raise 0.0558 0.0567** 0.00140 0.00259
(0.0332) (0.0210) (0.0926) (0.0924)
Cannot raise -0.0273 0.00125 -0.0338 0.00190
(0.0547) (0.0484) (0.136) (0.155)
Individual Covariates
Age in months 0.0150*** 0.0131*** 0.0121 0.00944
(0.00342) (0.00331) (0.00804) (0.00805)
Female 0.00689 0.0483* -0.103 -0.0550
(0.0269) (0.0254) (0.0638) (0.0600)
Mother’s education level(yrs) 0.0279*** 0.0187*** 0.0557*** 0.0466***
(0.00641) (0.00518) (0.0133) (0.0122)
Father’s education level(yrs) 0.0197** 0.0216*** 0.0475*** 0.0471***
(0.00736) (0.00426) (0.0128) (0.0126)
Mother’s religion is catholic 0.0608 0.0368 0.151 0.0888
(0.0530) (0.0330) (0.125) (0.178)
buddism -0.0834 -0.0738 0.0636 0.0502
(0.0814) (0.0832) (0.109) (0.0980)
protestant -0.393* -0.405 -0.651 -0.493
(0.198) (0.282) (0.427) (0.443)
Cao Dai -0.208 -0.351* -0.377 -0.657***
(0.181) (0.173) (0.251) (0.163)
Household size -0.0549*** -0.0205* -0.0787** -0.0348
(0.0169) (0.0109) (0.0297) (0.0262)
Live in rural -0.145*** 0.0638 -0.140 0.352
(0.0463) (0.0902) (0.0927) (0.279)
BMI -0.0309 -0.0117 -0.0216 0.00458
(0.0227) (0.0138) (0.0383) (0.0305)
Total income (mil. VND) 1.538** 0.399 2.546* 0.0900
(0.614) (0.373) (1.348) (1.241)
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Observations 812 812 812 812
R-squared 0.315 0.520 0.226 0.305
Notes: 1. Liquidity Constraints : “Can raise 230,000 VND” is the omitted cate-
gory. 2. Test scores are standardized. 3.Standard errors clustered within village
in parentheses. *** p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table 2.4: OLS Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Child Test Score in Round
3 (Younger Cohort)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PPVT PPVT Math Math
Liquidity Constraints
Probably can raise -0.0487 -0.0490 -0.0885* -0.163***
(0.0410) (0.0363) (0.0468) (0.0384)
Cannot raise -0.107* -0.126*** -0.161** -0.262***
(0.0596) (0.0384) (0.0772) (0.0723)
Individual Covariates
Age in months 0.0330*** 0.0299*** 0.0747*** 0.0663***
(0.00425) (0.00390) (0.00874) (0.00730)
Female 0.0165 0.00761 -0.0445 -0.0535
(0.0232) (0.0229) (0.0392) (0.0372)
Mother’s education level(yrs) 0.0499*** 0.0378*** 0.0464*** 0.0380***
(0.00657) (0.00570) (0.00976) (0.00847)
Father’s education level(yrs) 0.0242*** 0.0171*** 0.0530*** 0.0365***
(0.00453) (0.00432) (0.00772) (0.00657)
Mother’s religion is catholic -0.0388 -0.149* -0.394** -0.0316
(0.0716) (0.0797) (0.160) (0.171)
buddism 0.120 -0.156 -0.358*** -0.107
(0.215) (0.151) (0.0918) (0.108)
protestant -0.155 -0.339** -0.468** -0.270
(0.150) (0.127) (0.172) (0.213)
Cao Dai -0.209* -0.220** -0.477* -0.199
(0.106) (0.108) (0.256) (0.222)
none -0.0907** -0.175*** -0.474*** -0.144***
(0.0438) (0.0179) (0.0710) (0.0253)
Hoa Hao -0.533*** -0.515*** -0.0510 -0.125*
(0.0553) (0.0424) (0.0812) (0.0739)
Household size -0.0159* -0.0148** -0.0147 -0.00439
(0.00780) (0.00590) (0.0170) (0.0106)
Live in rural -0.0245 0.0706 -0.171* 0.203
(0.106) (0.115) (0.0982) (0.177)
BMI 0.00891 0.00310 0.0177 0.0250**
(0.00891) (0.00868) (0.0155) (0.0116)
Value of assets (mil) -0.0043** -0.0066*** -0.0060 -0.0077
(0.00188) (0.00109) (0.00550) (0.00469)
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456
R-squared 0.286 0.392 0.311 0.414
Notes: 1. Liquidity Constraints : “Can raise 300,000 VND” is the omitted cate-
gory. 2. Test scores are standardized. 3.Standard errors clustered within village
in parentheses. *** p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table 2.5: OLS Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Child Test Score in Round
3 (Older Cohort)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PPVT PPVT Math Math
Liquidity Constraints
Probably can raise -0.0647 -0.0341 0.0446 0.00945
(0.0405) (0.0321) (0.0797) (0.0769)
Cannot raise 0.110* -0.0116 -0.0340 -0.154
(0.0604) (0.0565) (0.173) (0.154)
Individual Covariates
Age in months 0.00599 -0.000165 0.000951 -0.00174
(0.00727) (0.00533) (0.0122) (0.0105)
Female 0.0107 0.0261 -0.289*** -0.246***
(0.0415) (0.0330) (0.0662) (0.0655)
Mother’s education level(yrs) 0.0289*** 0.0203*** 0.0612*** 0.0533***
(0.00794) (0.00649) (0.0165) (0.0152)
Father’s education level(yrs) 0.0268*** 0.0208** 0.0611*** 0.0606***
(0.00928) (0.00792) (0.0138) (0.0135)
Mother’s religion is catholic -0.286 -0.244 0.238 0.0281
(0.195) (0.217) (0.504) (0.473)
buddism -0.397** -0.411* -0.0710 -0.214
(0.195) (0.232) (0.540) (0.489)
protestant -0.845*** -0.926** -0.369 -0.192
(0.274) (0.406) (0.594) (0.740)
Cao Dai -0.513 -0.681** -0.0214 -0.819
(0.322) (0.274) (0.543) (0.503)
none -0.221 -0.284 0.0196 -0.106
(0.167) (0.196) (0.429) (0.426)
Household size -0.0288 -0.000384 -0.0469** -0.0121
(0.0189) (0.0139) (0.0224) (0.0256)
Live in rural -0.242* 0.131 -0.355 0.989***
(0.129) (0.0802) (0.263) (0.155)
BMI -0.0207 -0.00475 0.00842 -0.00620
(0.0210) (0.0126) (0.0264) (0.0273)
Value of assets (mil) 0.00109 0.000660 -0.00484 -0.00107
(0.00198) (0.000890) (0.00321) (0.00260)
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Observations 812 812 812 812
R-squared 0.222 0.437 0.222 0.348
Notes: 1. Liquidity Constraints : “Can raise 300,000 VND” is the omitted cate-
gory. 2. Test scores are standardized. 3.Standard errors clustered within village
in parentheses. *** p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table 2.6: OLS Estimation of Effect of Early (Round 2) and Current Liquidity Constraints
(Round 3) on Child Test Score (Round 3) by cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PPVT PPVT Math Math
Panel A: Younger Cohort
Probably can raise in Round 2 -0.0124 -0.0222 -0.114* -0.0475
(0.0371) (0.0305) (0.0579) (0.0497)
Cannot raise in Round 2 -0.0694 -0.0455 -0.180* -0.0381
(0.0525) (0.0426) (0.0985) (0.0862)
Probably can raise in Round 3 -0.0332 -0.0389 -0.0319 -0.143***
(0.0375) (0.0358) (0.0509) (0.0410)
Cannot raise in Round 3 -0.0994 -0.118*** -0.133 -0.251***
(0.0609) (0.0382) (0.0802) (0.0685)
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456
R-squared 0.286 0.391 0.307 0.410
Panel B: Older Cohort
Probably can raise in Round 2 0.00468 0.0558 0.0464 0.0453
(0.0447) (0.0391) (0.104) (0.108)
Cannot raise in Round 2 -0.193** -0.0627 -0.124 -0.140
(0.0919) (0.0696) (0.176) (0.139)
Probably can raise in Round 3 -0.0521 -0.0414 0.0752 0.0144
(0.0408) (0.0340) (0.0778) (0.0803)
Cannot raise in Round 3 0.150** -0.00235 -0.00174 -0.125
(0.0730) (0.0597) (0.185) (0.168)
Observations 812 812 812 812
R-squared 0.237 0.442 0.225 0.351
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Notes: 1. Liquidity Constraints : “Can raise 230,000 VND” is the omitted cate-
gory. 2. Test scores are standardized. 3.Standard errors clustered within village
in parentheses. *** p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1. 4. Individual covariates are: age,
gender, mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s religion, household size,
a dummy for living in Rural, BMI, and household income.
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Chapter 3
The Influence of Licensing
Engineers on Their Labor Market
with Morris M. Kleiner1 and Yingchun Wang23
3.1 Introduction
Analysts of the labor market for engineers have often documented the phenomenon of
recurring booms and busts (Hansen, 1961; Folk, 1970; Freeman, 1976). One potential public
policy solution has been to regulate the market for engineers, especially ones that require
licenses to practice within the occupation and thereby reduce market volatility for engineers.
With regulation and planning, perhaps these wide swings, which result in uncertainty for
both employers and those considering entering the occupation, could be reduced. Besides
the stated public policy rationale that labor market regulation improves public health and
safety, it also may serve to reduce fluctuations in the market for engineers. Licensing may
1Professor and AFL-CIO Chair, Humphrey School of Pubilc Affairs, University of Minnesota
2Assistant Professor, University of Houston Downtown
3Yoon Sun Hur, Morris M. Kleiner, and Yingchun Wang contributed equally to this work.
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create a web of rules that results in a more orderly functioning of the labor market for
the occupation that reduces uncertainty and variance in quality (Dunlop, 1958). Further,
engineers and the functioning of their labor markets are viewed as important contributors to
innovation and economic growth. An analysis that sheds light on the functioning of these
labor markets may contribute to an understanding of how institutional factors influence
engineering’s contribution to technological change. However, if the influence of licensing
for engineers is similar to markets for other regulated occupations, it may then restrict the
supply of labor, causing an increase in wages and a reduction in the utilization of engineers
in production (Kleiner and Kudrle, 2000; Kleiner and Todd, 2009).
The general policy issue of occupational licensing is an important and growing one
in the U.S. labor market, since it is among the fastest-growing labor market institutions
in the U.S. economy. For example, in the 1950s about 4.5 percent of the workforce was
covered by licensing laws by state government (Kleiner, 2006). By 2008 approximately 29
percent of the U.S. workforce had attained licensing by any level of government, and by
the 1990s more than 800 occupations were licensed by at least one state (Brinegar and
Schmitt, 1992; Kleiner and Krueger, 2013; Princeton Data Improvement Initiative, 2008).
This figure compares with about 12.6 percent of the members of the workforce who said
they were union members in the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the same year; that
value subsequently decreases 11.3 percent by the end of 2012 (Hirsch and Macpherson,
2011; Bureau of Labor Statistics Database, 2013). Although we do not have information
on trends for the licensing of engineers, their level of unionization has declined, which is
consistent with national trends. Figure 2.1 shows the decline in unionization for civil,
electrical, and industrial engineers from 1983 to 2010. The steepest dip was for electrical
engineers, where unionization declined from about 12.2 percent in 1983 to 4.8 percent in
2010. The smallest decline was for industrial engineers, whose rates of unionization declined
from 9.2 percent to 8.3 percent over the same time period. We will focus our analysis on
these engineering specialties for this chapter since they represent a continuum of more to
less regulated specialties in engineering.
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Since occupational regulation has many forms, describing its various types is worthwhile.
The occupational regulation of engineers in the United States generally takes three forms.
The least restrictive form is registration, in which individuals file their names, addresses,
and qualifications with a government agency before practicing their occupation. The regis-
tration process may include posting a bond or filing a fee. In contrast, certification permits
any person to perform the relevant tasks, but the government - or sometimes a private,
nonprofit agency - administers an examination or other method to determine qualifications
and certifies those who have achieved the level of skill and knowledge for certification. For
example, travel agents and car mechanics are generally certified but not licensed. Most
restrictive form of regulation is licensure; this form of regulation is often referred to as the
right to practice. Under licensure laws, working in an occupation for compensation without
first meeting government standards is illegal. Our analysis provides a first look at the role
of occupational licensing, rather than the other two forms of governmental regulation in the
labor market for engineers in the United States.
We examine the role for occupational licensing in the labor market for engineers from
2000 through 2012. Initially, we present the evolution and anatomy of occupational licensing
for engineers. Next, we present a theory of licensing and show how this form of regulation
leads to wages dropping to the competitive wage as the licensing authority increases the
supply of practitioners. In the following section, we show the data for the analysis and
present the growth of regulation for the three types of engineers in our data set. Next, we
present our empirical analysis for three large specialties in engineering - civil, electrical, and
industrial - when variations in occupational licensing characteristics such as examinations
and pass rates are included. In the final section, we summarize our results.
The theoretical model shows that government-granted licenses to protect the public can
also lead to rents for the members of the occupation. As more individuals are allowed into
the occupation by the planner, wages fall. To the extent that regulation reduces innova-
tion and that unregulated members of the occupation can do higher wage tasks, regulation
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may diminish wages. The estimates in our models are small for the labor market effects
of licensing, and they depend on the requirements and the engineering specialty examined.
Also, some evidence indicates that some licensing requirements influence the number of
hours worked by engineering specialty. The studies of the influence of licensing statutes on
labor market outcomes perhaps need better data on individuals who have a license rather
than just state licensing coverage, since coverage biases downward the influence of this type
of regulation (Gittleman and Kleiner, 2013). In this study we focus on licensing coverage
rather than attainment, since determining attainment is possible only when individual data
explicitly ask whether an individual is licensed.
3.2 The Evolution and Anatomy of Licensing for Engineers
Similar to other occupations that eventually became licensed, such as dentists and nurses,
the government regulation of engineers began in the early 1900s (Council of State Gov-
ernments, 2013). The first state to pass a licensure law was Wyoming in 1907. At the
time, Wyoming engineers were concerned with water speculators who lacked the qualifi-
cations or experience of trained engineers but nonetheless used the term “engineer” The
law was passed so that “all the surveying and engineering pertaining to irrigation works
should be properly done” (Russell and Stouffer (2003) p.1.) The American Society of Civil
Engineers (ASCE) supported this piece of legislation, but otherwise resisted the notion of
state-controlled licensing. After 1910, many civil engineering associations supported the
concept of state licensing in order to control specific aspects of the practice that would be
regulated. The ASCE promulgated a model law for licensure in 1910. This shift in policy
also helped the occupation of civil engineering to be consistent with regulations that were
being developed in other professions such as medicine and law, which had already accepted
licensure (Haber, 1991; Pfatteicher, 1996).
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Around 1920, the National Council of State Boards of Engineering Examiners was
formed to work for licensure in every state, help enforce regulations, and ensure appropri-
ate levels of experience and education for professional practice. This organization evolved
into the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (NCEES). As more
states adopted regulations for professional practice, these engineering associations also be-
came involved in advocating for the standardization of engineering curricula in professional
schools and universities. It took nearly 45 years for all 50 states to require licensure for the
practice of civil engineering, although these licenses were required only for certain types of
tasks that engineers perform.
In contrast, chemical, electrical, mechanical, and petroleum engineering were recognized
as title holders and were covered by licensing following World War II. In the 1960s, industrial
engineering was recognized as a title branch and was also regulated. Table 3.1 shows the
percentage of engineers licensed by specialty in the United States, according to the National
Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (NCEES) in 1995. Civil engineering
was by far the most regulated branch of engineering, with more than 44 percent of those
practicing being licensed; this percentage was more than twice that of mechanical engineers,
the second-most licensed engineering specialty. As the estimates in Table 3.1 show, about
9 percent of the more than 800,000 electrical engineers, the largest category of professional
engineers, were licensed in the mid-1990s, and only 8 percent of industrial engineers were
licensed. This suggests large variance in the amount of regulation in the occupation of
engineering. Moreover, the vast majority of engineers are covered by licensing statutes but
do not attain a license.
To measure the level of difficulty that each of the states sets for becoming a professional
engineer, we develop an index of restrictiveness of engineer regulation. Not only has the
level of licensing increased, but also the intensity of the process of becoming licensed has be-
come more difficult. Based on conversations with key officials at the NCEES, as well as with
focus groups comprising engineers, architects, and interior designers, we have identified the
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following central items as important in becoming licensed: a general age/education require-
ment, experience requirements, a written exam, a practical performance exam, a specific
engineering specialty exam, reciprocity requirements from other states, and a continuing
education requirement4.
These elements are the basis of an index of the rigor of the licensing process, in addition
to the type of licensing. Using this index, we can trace the evolution of the intensity of
the licensing index in the period 1995 to2012. Table 3.3 summarizes the index of licensing
regulations for engineers. The results show a slight upward movement in the mean values
and a narrower spread in the variance of the licensing provisions across states. Occupational
licensing is growing among states, and its provisions to enter and maintain good standing
as a licensed professional engineer are becoming more stringent.
The nation’s umbrella engineering licensing body embraced a so-called Model Rule that
would extend by 30 the number of extra credit-hours BS-degreed engineers must have to
gain a professional license, but no state licensing board has made it a reality. However, the
deadline for the professional association is still more than 5 years away in 2020. The goals
of the licensing groups are to increase the status of engineers. For example, a former ASCE
president and supporter of the increased requirements for becoming a licensed engineer
stated the following: ”If we want to meet challenges and be prepared to protect the public,
engineers need more depth of knowledge,” says Blaine Leonard, former ASCE president.
”You can’t get it in programs under pressure.” Proponents would like to see engineering
attain the same professional status as medicine and accounting. The National Academy
of Engineering and the National Society of Professional Engineers support the idea (Rubin
and Rubin, 2012).
4We met with officials at the Minnesota Board of Architecture, Engineering, Land Surveying Landscape
Architecture, Geoscience and Interior Design (AELSLAGID) regarding key criteria for licensing in that State
and with licensed engineers in Minnesota, Arizona and California.
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3.3 Theoretical Framework
To provide a theoretical context for our empirical work, we first present a model of the
influence of licensing on the supply of labor. In the following section, we focus on the
demand for labor and how the government can be an important factor within a licensing
model. The analysis of wage determination under licensing in engineering builds on work by
Perloff (1980)on the influence of licensing laws on wage changes in the construction industry.
The basic model posits that market forces are largely responsible for wage determination
and that the demand for work is highly cyclical. This approach would also apply to the
engineering labor market. Perloff presents two cases. In the first, there are no costs to
shifting across industries so that labor supply is completely elastic at the opportunity wage.
In this case, the increase in the demand for work would have little effect on wages, since
workers would flow between varying industries. The introduction of a licensing law renders
the supply of labor inelastic. In this case, labor cannot flow between the sectors so that
variations in demand would be reflected in the wage. In his empirical work, Perloff shows
that for electricians, more so than for either laborers or plumbers, state regulations make
the supply curve highly inelastic. Consequently, the ability of a state to limit entry or
impose major costs on entry through licensing would enhance the occupation’s ability to
raise wages. We would expect that a similar approach would apply to the market for
engineers, with more inelastic supply curves for civil engineers relative to electrical and
industrial engineers.
Unlike the work that has been developed on the supply side, relatively little analysis
has been done on how degrees of restriction of labor supply with occupational licensing
influence engineers’ wages and their amount of work, and how such restrictions of supply
make the labor market deviate from a competitive market. Our model focuses on the supply
restriction of labor, and we develop a general model that we will apply to the regulation of
engineers. We develop a model as follows:
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Let Q ≡∑ni=1 qi, where qi is each engineers work output, n is the number of engineers in
the market, and Q is the total quantity of supply. Each engineer’s monetary utility function
is Ui = qiP (Q)−Di(qi) , where D denotes the engineers disutility. The first-order condition
for utility maximization of engineer i is P (Q)−D′i(qi) + qiP ′(Q) = 0.
From the above equation, we have:
P (Q)−D′i(qi)
P
=
qi
Q
− PP ′(Q)Q
=
α

(3.1)
where α = qiQ is engineer i’s market share, and  = − PP ′(Q)Q is the elasticity of demand.
Thus, the gap between price and marginal disutility is proportional to the engineers market
share and inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand. Price exceeds the engineers
marginal disutility. The larger the difference, the more prices deviate from the socially
efficient price.
For instance, for the symmetric case in which every engineer has the same output,
with linear demand, P (Q) = 1 − aQ for all i, and the convex disutility function being
D = bq+ cq2. We assume that a, b, c are greater than zero, so that the demand is inversely
related to supply and the disutility is a convex function. The first-order condition of the
engineers utility maximization becomes 1 − aQ − b − 2cqi − aq1 = 0. The equilibrium is
symmetric for this symmetric model: Q = nq, where q is the output per engineer. Hence,
we obtain:
q =
1− b
an+ 2c+ a
(3.2)
The market price is:
p = b+
(1− b)(2c+ a)
an+ 2c+ a
(3.3)
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And each engineer’s utility is :
U =
(1− b)2(a+ c)
(an+ 2c+ a)2
(3.4)
The number of engineers is an exogenous variable in the model. It is decided by the pass
rate for the licensing examination. The stricter the licensing examination, the smaller the
n. Equations 3.2 to 3.4 show that when the licensing requirement is stricter, the incumbent
engineers wage, output per person (measured as work hours in the empirical section), and
utility of the engineer will all increase.
From the above results and Equation 3.1, we have
P (Q)=D′i(qi)
P =
α
 =
a(1−b)
abn+2c+a . So
another implication of the model is that the fewer the number of engineers, the further
the wage will deviate from the socially efficient wage (p = D(qi)). When the number of
engineers becomes very large (n→∞), the wage tends to become the competitive wage.
3.4 Data, Model, and Estimation
Using the above model as our guide, we now present the details of the information on the
regulations facing engineers and the labor market conditions of the three broadly represen-
tative types of engineers: civil, electrical, and industrial. We chose these types of engineers
because they reflect a continuum of regulation ranging from civil engineers who are the
most regulated, electrical engineers less so, and industrial engineers the least regulated by
state statutes. Table 3.2 displays the key elements (and their operational definition) of the
licensing provisions in the statutes and administrative provisions that we plan to examine
for each of the states in our sample of engineers.
Table 3.3 shows the yearly growth in the occupational licensing statutes index over
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the period 1995-2012. The results indicate that the occupation experienced growth in
regulations governing entry and training requirements. The level of the index or the number
of items included in the measure grew from 6.94 to 7.25, or by about 4 percent. This reflects
the intensity of the growth of requirements to enter and maintain the status as a licensed
engineer. Further, the standard deviation declined by almost 23 percent, suggesting greater
standardization of the requirements for licensing across states over time.
Table 3.4 shows the relative ranking of the states that have the highest and lowest values
in the index. We also developed values that were established through an expert systems
focus group approach to test the sensitivity of the results to alternative methods of evalu-
ation. In this approach, an engineering student and a law student were given the data and
asked to rank the states based on issues that were personally important to them as profes-
sionals in their respective fields. There was a high degree of consistency for the empirical
and qualitative approaches. For many states, we were able to obtain the pass rates for the
licensing examination for engineers. Figure 3.2 shows the states and time trend in years for
which we were able to obtain from NCEES the overall engineering pass rates. The plots in
the figure show that California has one of the lowest steady-state pass rate for the engineer-
ing exam, averaging about 40 percent per year. In contrast, the pass rate for the licensing
of engineers in Idaho is well above 80 percent. Unfortunately, no systematic national es-
timates could be developed because of the state data limitations over time and across states.
3.4.1 Economic Data
As a key part of our examination of the influence of regulation on the labor market for
engineers, we use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2001 through
2012. Table 3.5 presents the basic information that we used for our analysis. These vari-
ables include the standard variables from the ACS to include Mincer-type human capital
variables such as gender, age, experience, education, and race. Unfortunately, no data on
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union status are available in the ACS. The means and standard deviations for the basic
variables in the ACS are included in Table 3.5 by type of engineer. They show that there
are small differences in human capital characteristics such as age, experience, or education
across engineering specialties. However, the percentage of civil engineers who work for the
government (about 24 percent) and are self-employed (about 5 percent) is much higher than
in the other two types of engineering subgroups. The hourly earnings of electrical engineers
(about $ 37 per hour), are the highest of the three categories. Generally, the licensing
requirements for civil engineers have been in force the longest and are the most detailed
across states. The estimates for hours worked are also derived from the ACS. Since there
are more observations over time for civil engineers, we have information for all states and
years for this category. For electrical and industrial engineers, however, some state and year
observations are missing in the ACS, so states such as Wyoming, Hawaii, Montana, and
South Dakota are missing observations for a couple of years in our sample.
3.4.2 Wage Determination
Our empirical strategy is to first examine the three categories of engineers - civil, electrical,
and industrial - that may vary greatly by the type of regulation that influences their ability
to find employment. We estimate the model using all engineers in the categories together
and then estimate wage equations for each group separately. In Figure 3.3 we show kernel
density plots for the three types of engineers in our study. The results show that electrical
engineers have the highest mean value for wages and the widest distribution of earnings
among the three types of engineers we study, but industrial engineers have the lowest mean
value.
Our basic model uses an earnings function and compares the three types of engineers
(the least regulated one, industrial engineers, is the excluded category). Our basic model is
of the following form:
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ln(Earningsist) = α+ βRst + γXist + Tist + δs + θt + ist (3.5)
where Earningsist is the hourly earnings of engineer i at state s in year t; Tist is the type of
engineer (civil, electrical, or industrial) for person is state s in year t; Rst is the occupational
licensing regulations (and its components) in state s in year t; Xist is the vector that includes
covariates measuring characteristics of each person; δ and θ are state and year fixed effects,
respectively; and ist is the error term in our panel data.
5
The model is a basic fixed effects approach that can also be viewed as a generalization
of the conventional two-group two-period difference-in-difference model.6 The estimates
presented in the tables show the estimates for both a traditional panel estimate using
individuals as the unit of observation of the role of regulation on wage determination and a
two-stage estimation procedure. For the two-stage procedure, the first stage is developed by
estimating a model of individual-level outcomes on covariates and a full set of state x X time
fixed effects. The coefficients on the state x X time fixed effects represent state x time mean
outcomes that have been purged of the variation associated with the within-cell variation
in the covariates. In the second stage, these adjusted cell level means are estimates on the
policy variables and fixed effects. The two-step approach is a way of performing aggregation
while still allowing for adjustment of individual-level covariates, which is a limitation of the
pure aggregation.7 The basic panel estimates include individual covariates as well as state
5The error term can be union status and personal preferences etc.
6We also included time-varying state-level controls, such as the state median household income, but found
that they have no explanatory power. Consequently, we do not show the results in this chapter.
7Moulton (1990) criticized the differences-in-differences (DID) type of analysis when the variable of
interest (policy variable) is at the aggregate level while the variable in the dependent variable (e.g. wages
of workers) is at the individual level. He indicates that this type of DID analysis may cause the problem
of clustering that small group level clustering can inflate standard error by large amount. Bertrand, Duflo,
and Mullainathan (2004), Donald and Lang (2007), and Conley and Taber (2011) discuss about the possible
solutions for the problem. Those scholar have agreed that the cluster robust standard error can work
perfectly only when the number of cluster is large enough and there are not many observations within
cluster. The proposed solutions from scholars are aggregating the outcome data to cell (e.g. state-year)
means and statistical testing based on placebo distribution and randomization inference approach. The
aggregation analysis has one difficulties when one want to use covariates that varies within the cells. To
deal with this issue, this chapter employs a two level model. The first level is a regression of the dependent
variable (wages and hours worked) on covariates and a full set of interactions of state and time fixed effects.
The interaction of state and time fixed effect tries to exploit the state-specific trends and the coefficients of
69
and year fixed effects.8
Table 3.6 shows estimates from the model developed from the overall licensing index on
wage determination using both the individual observations and the two- level analyses with
controls. Since the index is an imprecise measurement of regulation, we develop a relative
measure of regulation of high, medium, and low levels of regulation using our index. We
then compare the highest levels of regulation relative to the low and medium ones. The first
column shows the basic bivariate relationship between having the most restrictive licensing
statutes and wage determination with the full sample of the ACS. The basic relationship
shows a statistically significant 2 percent effect.9 However, in the second column when
personal characteristics and state specific covariates are included, the estimates are still
positive but small and not statistically significant. In examining the various engineering
specializations in columns 3 through 8, we can see that there is some variation. For example,
the bivariate estimates for civil engineers show a positive but small influence of being in
a state with the most stringent regulations in the first stage, but no effect in the second
stage. Similarly, for both electrical and industrial engineers, the engineering regulations
have a small but positive effect in the first stage bivariate estimates, but no influence in
the second stage results. The significant estimates range from a high of 4 percent with
no covariates for industrial engineers with no covariates to no effect in the fully specified
model. The categorical specifications show regulation for engineers has a small effect that
is close to zero. This is not unlike some of the specifications of the influence of unions on
wage determination for other professional organizations (Lewis, 1986). Moreover, we have
estimates only of licensing coverage and not those who have attained a license, which may
bias our results downward (Gittleman and Kleiner, 2013). However, licensing requirements
may also have effects on the supply of hours to the market.
these interactions shows the mean outcomes in state and time level that is adjusted to the variations within
cell in the individual covariates. In the second stage, these adjusted cell level means are regressed on the
policy variables of interest, state fixed effects and time fixed effects and their interactions.
8The standard errors for these models were computed using a Huber-White covariance matrix that allowed
for clustering at the state level.
9We also estimated models that examined the influence of tougher licensing before and after the great
recession of 2008, and found results similar to those presented in Tables 3.6, 3.7, 3.9, and 3.10.
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The models developed for hours of work use approaches similar to the ones developed
for our wage equation models. In a similar manner, we examine employment growth for
each of the categories of engineers from 2001 to 2012. The basic model is of the following
form:
ln(Employmentist) = α+ βRst + γXist + Tist + δs + θt + ist (3.6)
where Employmentist is hours of work per week per engineer in state s in time period t for
individual i; Rst is the regulation measure and its components at state s in time period t;
Tist is the type of engineer at state s in time period t for individual i; the vector Xst includes
covariates measuring economic and human capital characteristics within each state; δs and
θt are state and year fixed effects, respectively; and ist is the error term.
Table 3.7 gives the basic results for the impact of the licensing index on hours of work
supplied by engineers using the specified model and categorical measures of regulation of
high relative to low or medium. The results are consistent in showing that regulation is
associated with an increase in hours worked by about 1 percent in the bivariate estimates.
The two-level analysis shows similar and more imprecise effect, even though it is not statis-
tically significant. If regulation is effective in restricting the supply of new entrants to some
extent, then those in the occupation are likely to work more hours. The results in Table
3.7 are consistent with this hypothesis.
Although the categorical transformation of the overall index does not show much ef-
fect on the key labor market variables of wages and hours worked, perhaps several of the
individual components of the licensing index may influence wages and hours worked. The
use of an examination to determine the impact of this variable on wage determination has
been used in other studies (Kleiner and Kudrle, 2000; Kleiner and Krueger, 2013). Through
the examination process and the establishment of higher standards, access to and supply of
engineers can be reduced, and if demand remains constant, wages can increase. Moreover,
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the pass rate for the engineering exam may also limit the entry of new engineers and drive
up wages and hours for those who do become engineers.
In Table 3.8 we list the states that require a professional exam for each specific type of
licensing examination. In order to become licensed, engineers usually take a fundamental
or first exam, the basic step toward becoming a licensed engineer. This exam is often ad-
ministered to engineers just prior to their finishing undergraduate studies. The professional
exam, in contrast, covers general engineering practices and is usually given after engineers
have been practicing for four or more years. It is the final stage of licensing coverage for
entry into the occupation. Table 3.8 shows that Ohio and Arkansas adopted a professional
exam in 2002 and 2009, respectively; they serve as basis for a difference-in-difference anal-
ysis. The difference-in-difference model is relative to Ohio and Arkansas, which were the
states that changed its regulatory statutes for exams over the time period of our analysis.
In order to provide sensitivity analysis for our previous estimates and include the esti-
mates for an additional regulatory requirement, we include whether there is a professional
exam requirement to become licensed. Table 3.9 shows the estimates on wage and hours us-
ing seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methods for the influence of having a professional
exam requirement as part of the licensing requirement. Since only two states changed the
exam requirements during the period under study, we used this method as an additional
sensitivity test of our estimates. Panel A shows the results when engineers are categorized
by type of engineering field: civil, electrical, and industrial. In Panel B we estimate the
model for all the engineers in our sample. Those results are consistent with the general
results shown in Table 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 and show only a small coefficient size for this re-
quirement and varying levels of significance, based on the type of engineering specialty and
the labor market outcome variable selected which was hourly wages or hours worked.
In Table 3.11, we examine whether the lagged professional exam requirement variable
may have influenced economic factors. Using the lagged professional licensing requirement
and current economic data through 2012, the table shows that these results are consistent in
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displaying a mixed to minor influence on wage determination. At least for licensing cover-
age, which is what our data allow us to measure, occupational licensing has a small influence
on wage determination for civil engineers, but has a mixed influence on other engineering
specialties. This may reflect the fact that the attainment of a license matters more with
respect to wage determination, rather than the passage of a law regulating an occupation
that is largely unregulated by the government (Gittleman and Kleiner, 2013). Even though
H. Gregg Lewis finds that being represented by a union raises wages by about 15 percent in
aggregate, for many occupations such as hospital workers and well-educated male workers,
the influence of unions is either zero or even slightly negative (Lewis, 1986). Similarly, for
civil engineers, who are more heavily licensed, tougher regulations may not enhance their
earnings, perhaps because unregulated workers are able to be more innovative and create
new markets relative to engineers who have their work standardized by the government
(Friedman, 1962).
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents the first comprehensive analysis of the role of occupational licensing
requirements on the labor market for civil, electrical, and industrial engineers. These groups
of engineers represent the largest number of engineers that are covered by occupational
licensing statutes in the United States. We initially trace the historical evolution of licensing
for engineers. Second, we present a theoretical rationale for the role of government in the
labor market for the occupation. In the model, the government’s ability to control supply
through licensing restrictions and the pass rate limits the number of engineers, which drives
up wages. These results are useful for informing the empirical models for engineers.
In the empirical section, we show that licensing for these occupations has grown more
somewhat more rigorous during the period 2001-2012. We then estimate a panel data
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model (state level) for the engineers in our sample using the ACS. In the U.S. economy, if
engineers achieve the goal of their professional association of more rigid requirements, and
a longer time to become an engineer, the growth of regulation of the occupation may reduce
customer access to engineers and slow down the ability of builders and manufacturers to
use engineering services. Our study provides a first look at these issues. Exploring the
potential issue of selection across engineering specialties, and using more detailed analysis
such as the use of discontinuities when the passage of more rigorous laws occurs, may provide
more refined or precise estimates and examples of the role of regulation in the market for
engineers. Further, a more thorough analysis would include individuals who have attained
a license rather than licensing coverage, and these data would allow us to obtain a better
measure of the influence of occupational licensing on those who chose to get the credential
to legally do certain engineering tasks.
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3.6 Figures and Tables
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Figure 3.1: Decline in Unionization for Civil, Electrical and Industrial Engineers, 1983
through 2010
Note: Current Population Survey, various years calculated by the authors.
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Figure 3.2: Engineering Exam Pass Rate by State
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Figure 3.3: Empirical Distribution of Hourly Rate for Three Types of Engineers, 2009
Note: Sample includes those engineers making above the minimum wage and excludes those
with greater than the top 1 percent of hourly wage.
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Table 3.1: Percentage of Engineers Licensed by Specialty, 1995
Engineering Disci-
pline
Approx. #
Engineers
Approx. #
Licensed
Percentage
Licensed
Civil 360,000 160,000 44
Mechanical 395,000 91,000 23
Electrical 803,000 73,000 9
Chemical 180,000 15,000 8
Industrial 133,000 11,000 8
Agricultural 40,000 5,000 13
Mining and Metals 30,000 5,000 17
Other 259,000 40,000 15
Total 2,200,000 400,000 18
Source: Paul Taylor, NCEES Licensure Bulletin, De-
cember 1995
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Table 3.2: Key Elements in Development of the Licensing Index for Engineers
Major Components Definition
Education requirement 3 if minimum level of education required to be licensed
is bachelors degree; 2 if it is associates degree; 1 if
board decides; otherwise 0
Experience requirement 3 if minimum level of experience required to be li-
censed is 8 years; 2 if it is 4 years; 1 if it is 2 years; 0
if no requirement
Professional exam require-
ment
1 if professional exam is required to be licensed; oth-
erwise 0
Fundamental exam require-
ment
1 if fundamental engineering exam is required; other-
wise 0
Interim exam requirement 1 if exam required for interim permit; otherwise 0
Continuing education require-
ment
1 if state has any requirement for continuing educa-
tion; otherwise 0
Specific exam requirement 1 if specific additional exam is required for engineering
discipline; otherwise 0
Notes: 1. Developed by the authors. 2. The interim permission is for engineer
who has a license in a state and wants to get another one in other state.
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Table 3.3: Growth of Occupational Licensing Intensity over Time
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1995 6.94 2.04 0.00 9.00
1996 6.86 2.03 0.00 9.00
1997 6.89 1.86 0.00 9.00
1998 7.08 1.71 0.00 9.00
1999 7.08 1.71 0.00 9.00
2000 7.06 1.70 0.00 9.00
2001 7.06 1.70 0.00 9.00
2002 7.06 1.70 0.00 9.00
2003 7.06 1.70 0.00 9.00
2004 7.08 1.72 0.00 9.00
2005 7.08 1.72 0.00 9.00
2006 7.08 1.72 0.00 9.00
2007 7.08 1.72 1.00 9.00
2008 7.08 1.72 1.00 9.00
2009 7.08 1.72 1.00 9.00
2010 7.25 1.59 1.00 9.00
2011 7.25 1.59 1.00 9.00
2012 7.25 1.58 1.00 9.00
Note: Index is the summated rating value of the key provisions for li-
censing engineers as noted in Table 3.2 tabulated by the authors. The
Number of State is 51 for each year.
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Table 3.4: Regulation Rankings of Top and Bottom States by Restrictiveness of Licensing,
2009
Top States Index Bottom States Index
Pennsylvania 9 Virginia 1
Georgia 9 Minnesota 3
Texas 9 South Dakota 4
Illinois 9 DC 5
Arizona 9 Delaware 5
Colorado 9 Connecticut 5
Note: The higher the index, the more restrictive.
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Table 3.8: State Professional Exam Requirements for Licensure of Engineers
Professional Exam Re-
quired
No Professional Exam
Required
Changer (year of
change)
Alabama Hawaii Ohio (2002)
Alaska Missouri Arkansas (2009)
Arizona New Hampshire
California New Jersey
Colorado New Mexico
Connecticut Oregon
Delaware South Dakota
District of Columbia Utah
Florida Virginia
Georgia Washington
Idaho Wisconsin
Illinois Wyoming
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
West Virginia
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Table 3.10: Panel B: Effect on Wage Using SUR for All Engineers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One level Two level
Variable Log of wage Log of
hours
worked
Log of wage Log of
hours
Professional
Exam
-0.006*** 0.004*** -0.107*** -0.022*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.012)
Constant 3.446*** 3.760*** 3.571*** 3.775***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.013)
Observations 7,231,650 7,231,650 612 612
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.854 0.303
Basic control NO NO YES YES
Year fixed NO NO YES YES
State fixed NO NO YES YES
Note: Panels A and B were estimated with age, schooling in years, gender, mari-
tal status, experience, experience-squared, race, U.S. citizenship, for profit sector,
and self-employment. Two stage regressions are weighted by the number of en-
gineers. The second-stage estimates are aggregate state-level estimates of hours
worked calculated from the predicted hours worked individual model, which are
then aggregated to the state level. The ACS sample uses individuals who earn
less than 250 USD per hour and who are college graduates. Standard errors are
in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Chapter 4
Effect of Liquidity Constraints on
Children’s Non-cognitive Skills in
Vietnam
4.1 Introduction
Parents invest in their children’s human capital in several ways. They can buy quality
textbooks, provide appropriate nutrition, and send their children to extracurricular classes.
Besides these material forms of support, parents can also give emotional support to enhance
their children’s human capital. Liquidity constraints may determine parents’ investments;
parents without liquidity constraints can invest in the optimal level of their children’s hu-
man capital accumulation. Income shocks caused by events such as severe weather and
unemployment may lead to liquidity constraints among parents, and so may affect parents’
investments in their children’s human capital including cognitive and non-cognitive skills
90
(Becker, 1975; Flug, Spilimbergo, and Wachtenheim, 1998).1
Many scholars have examined the link between liquidity constraints and human capital
accumulation. Most of the studies, however, both theoretically and empirically, measure
the effect of liquidity constraints on schooling and cognitive skills, such as academic perfor-
mance (Becker and Tomes, 1986; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Caucutt and Lochner, 2012).
Relatively less attention has been paid to the link between liquidity constraints and non-
cognitive skills.
A relatively new literature emphasizes the role of non-cognitive skills in schooling, labor
market outcomes, and even development. Empirical evidence suggests that non-cognitive
skills have a significant effect on education and labor market outcomes (Heckman and Ru-
binstein, 2001; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006; Almlund et al., 2011; Glewwe, Huang,
and Park, 2014). Ray (2006) states that poverty and failure of aspirations are closely linked,
since dream and the process of attaining dreams, which are related to aspiration, may be
hindered by poverty. Dalton, Ghosal, and Mani (2015) explain, using a theoretical model,
that low aspirations is a consequence of poverty. Their model indicates that raising aspi-
rations can lead to poverty reduction without the relief of material constraints. Glewwe,
Ross, and Wydick (2013) explain that ‘external constraints’ and ‘internal constraints’ are
both important in human capital accumulation. ‘External constraints’ can be defined as
barriers of access to school or health services, while ‘internal constraints’ are related to a
loss of hopeful feelings, low aspirations, low self-efficacy, and low self-esteem. Glewwe, Ross,
and Wydick (2013) show that child sponsorship programs have a positive effect on the relief
of internal constraints, leading to higher self-esteem and self-expectations.
Despite evidence emphasizing the importance of non-cognitive skills, and the effect of
liquidity constraints on human capital accumulation, few things are known about the link
1There are many terms used by scholars to indicate child’s emotional development. Psychologists and
sociologists have used the term as “socio-emotional development” (e.g. Smilansky and Shefatya (1990)),
while economists have widely used “non-cognitive skills” (e.g. Heckman and Rubinstein (2001)). This study
uses “non-cognitive skills” to indicate child’ socio-emotional development, such as self-esteem, self-efficacy,
and aspirations.
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between liquidity constraints and non-cognitive skills.2 McLoyd (1998) discusses in the-
oretical terms that explains the mediating variables of how parents’ economic difficulties
affect their child’s socio-emotional outcomes. For example, harsh parenting, inconsistent
parenting, and discrete and chronic stressors from financial risks may negatively affect a
child’s non-cognitive skills. However, if parents can reduce their liquidity constraints and
thus borrow money, their dysphoria, harsh attitudes, and stress may decrease, reducing the
probability that their child’s non-cognitive skills are affected by their temporary economic
difficulties. However, few empirical studies have estimated the effect of liquidity constraints
on non-cognitive skills.
This chapter empirically estimates the effect of parents’ liquidity constraints on chil-
dren’s non-cognitive skills in Vietnam. The Young Lives household survey for Vietnam
provides unique data that measure children’s non-cognitive skills, such as self-esteem, self-
efficacy, and aspirations. It also collected information on households’ liquidity constraints.
To estimate the causal effect of liquidity constraints on a child’s non-cognitive skills, this
study uses direct measurements of liquidity constraints, whereas most studies on the effect
of liquidity constraints have measured those effects indirectly by estimating the effects of
income shocks.3
The Young Lives household survey data for Vietnam were collected for two cohorts, a
younger cohort born in 2001–2002 and an older cohort born in 1994–1995. Both cohorts
were surveyed over three rounds (2002, 2006 and 2009).4 Using these data, this study
will estimate the effect of parents’ liquidity constraints on children’s non-cognitive skills
at different ages. In addition, this study also examines to whether the timing of liquidity
constraints matters. Similar to cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills begin to develop at an
early age (Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2010). Using the panel data collected using the
2Some studies have examined the determinants of non-cognitive skills other than liquidity constraints.
For example, Howard (2011) presents evidence that food provided at home can affect a child’s non-cognitive
skills.
3For more details on former literature on liquidity constraints see first chapter of this thesis.
4A fourth round was collected in 2013, but is yet publicly available.
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Young Lives household survey questionnaires for Vietnam, this chapter also measures the
effect of liquidity constraints that occur when child is young on the child’s non-cognitive
skill at a later age.
This study accounts for the endogenous nature of liquidity constraints. OLS estimates
may yield biased and inconsistent estimates when liquidity constraints are endogenous:
the liquidity constraints variables may be correlated with the error term. There may be
unobserved variables that affect children’s non-cognitive skills and are also correlated with
liquidity constraints. For example, parents’ ambition may affect the likelihood of parents
getting access to credit and also directly affect their children’s cognitive skills. This chapter
will use instrumental variable methods to address bias due to endogeneity. The instrumental
variables exploit information about the financial environment faced by household, such as
the existence of credit institutions and relatives in the community. These instruments
affect the liquidity constraints that households face but do not directly affect children’s
non-cognitive skills. Other instrumental variables used in this chapter are past rainfall
volatility and current rainfall shocks in the community, which capture the inherent riskiness
of agricultural income. Past rainfall volatility and current rainfall shocks are unlikely to
directly affect the children’s non-cognitive skills.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 develops a analytical framework that re-
lates parents’ liquidity constraints to children’s non-cognitive skills. Section 4.3 describes
the main data sets, including the Young Lives household survey data and rainfall data for
Vietnam, and Section 4.4 develops the empirical specification. The estimation results are
presented in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 summarizes the results and discusses policy
implications.
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4.2 Analytical Framework
This section provides a simple analytical framework to measure the effect of liquidity con-
straints on children’s non-cognitive skills during early and late childhood.
Let HCt denote a child’s human capital when the child is t years old. The children’s
human capital formation function is:
HCt = ft(Lt, Ht, Xt, t) (4.1)
where Lt denotes the households’ liquidity constraints when the child is t years old, Ht is
household characteristics, such as income, father’s education, mother’s education, household
size, rural or urban residence, and religion of mother. Xt is the child’s characteristics, such
as gender, age, and an indicator for being a first born child, and t is the error term.
The error term represents the unobserved characteristics and preferences for human capital
investment, such as the parents’ ambition.
This chapter allows for the possibility that a household’s liquidity constraints when
the child is t years old are endogenous. It means that the liquidity constraints variable
can be correlated with the error term, which includes the unobserved characteristics and
preferences for human capital investment. For example, the more ambitious parents are
the less probability that the parents are liquidity constrained and the more likely that they
invest in child’s human capital. To avoid the bias from the endogenous liquidity constraints,
this study uses instrumental variables such as the existence of subsidized credit program
in the community, CPt, the existence of savings cooperative in the community, SCt, the
existence of relatives in community, RELt, past rainfall volatility in the community, RV ,
and current rainfall shocks in the community, RSt. The following specification presents the
first stage of equation for instrumental variable estimation of equation (4.1):
Lt = f
L
t (CPt, SCt, RELt, RV,RSt, Ht, Xt, 
L
t ) (4.2)
94
To obtain an understanding of the effect of liquidity constraints on children’s non-
cognitive skills at different stages of childhood, this study will check whether the effect is
different at different ages.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Young Lives Household Survey Data for Vietnam
The Young Lives household survey data for Vietnam were used to collect information on
child and household characteristics of 3,000 children. These children are divided into two
group: 1,000 older cohort children born in 1994–95, and 2,000 younger cohort children born
in 2000–01. The data have been collected over three rounds: Round 1 in 2002, Round 2 in
2006, and Round 3 in 2009.
The younger cohort children were about 1 year old in 2002 (Round 1), 4–5 years old in
2006 (Round 2), and 7–8 years old in 2009 (Round 3). The older cohort children were 7-8
years old in 2002 (Round 1), 11–12 years old in 2006 (Round 2), and 14–15 years old in
2009 (Round 3). To see the effect of liquidity constraints on children’s non-cognitive skills
at different child ages, this chapter conducts separate analyses by cohort and round. The
younger cohort children in Round 2 were too young to measure their non-cognitive skills, and
the non-cognitive skills data were not collected in Round 1. Therefore this study excludes
the younger cohort in Rounds 1 and 2 from the analysis. Thus this chapter examines three
sub-samples: the older cohort in Rounds 2 and 3, and the younger cohort in Round 3.
This study excludes children who have no data on non-cognitive skills, or who are miss-
ing selected household and child characteristics. Compared to Chapter 2 of this thesis,
which estimated the effect of liquidity constraints on children’s cognitive skills, this chapter
includes fewer children in the analysis because of missing data for the non-cognitive skills
95
variable. About half of the children are dropped because of the missing data in the non-
cognitive skills. This study also excludes older cohort children who do not appear in at least
one of two rounds (Rounds 2 and 3), or who have missing data on individual and household
characteristics. The final numbers of children by cohort and round, which vary by cohort,
round and the non-cognitive skills variable, are shown in Table 4.1. Note that aspirations
was not measured for the younger cohort in Round 3. The self-esteem is measured for older
cohort in Round 3, but this variable missing for most of the sample, so this study includes
only self-efficacy and aspirations for the older cohort in Round 3.
Table 4.1: Number of Observations and Child Age by Sub-samples
Round 2 (2006) Round 3 (2009)
Younger cohorts 835(Self-esteem),
871(Self-efficacy)
(born 2001-2) 7-8 yrs
Older cohorts 752(Self-esteem, self-
efficacy, aspiration)
674(Self-efficacy),
809(Aspiration)
(born 1994-5) 11-12 yrs 14-15 yrs
4.3.2 Measurement of Non-cognitive Skills
Following Dercon and Sanchez (2011), this chapter measures children’s non-cognitive skills
in three dimensions: self-esteem, self-efficacy and aspirations.
Table 4.2 shows the questions used to measure children’s non-cognitive skills in the
Young Lives household questionnaires for Vietnam. There are several questions for mea-
suring self-esteem and self-efficacy. Following Glewwe, Ross, and Wydick (2013) and Der-
con and Sanchez (2011), this chapter uses summary indices (averages) of these questions.
Glewwe, Ross, and Wydick (2013) indicate that there is a potential problem when using
each question as a measure of non-cognitive skill and running separate regressions. There
is a possibility that some variables show “significant” impacts even though the real impact
is zero, when a large number of regressions are estimated for large number of dependent
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variables. Using the summary index in the regressing will help avoid this problem.
The total score for self-esteem is calculated by the average of the eight questions about
how the child feels about his or her life. A child can choose one of the following answers for
each question: strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, and strongly
agree. I code the answers so that strongly disagree is coded as 1, disagree is coded as 2,
neither agree nor disagree is coded as 3, agree is coded as 4, and strongly agree is coded as
5.5 Thus the higher the score, the higher the self-esteem. These questions are based on the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Dercon and Sanchez, 2011).6
To measure self-efficacy, the Young Lives household questionnaire for Vietnam contains
questions on whether the child thinks that he (or she) can control his (or her) life by himself
(or herself) and whether he (or she) trusts that his (or her) effort will be rewarded in the
future. The negative question is recorded so that higher values indicate a higher self-efficacy
level. The total score of self-efficacy is calculated by the average of the five questions.
Aspirations can be measured by asking whether children can set a goal (Dercon and
Sanchez, 2011; Quaglia and Cobb, 1996). The Young Lives household questionnaires for
Vietnam ask children about the level of formal education that the child wants to complete
if there were no constraints, so that he or she could stay at school as long as he or she likes.
The children can answer with the year and level of the education they want to achieve.
This chapter coded one to twelve for the education until the high school, fourteen to the
technical or pedagogical institution, sixteen to the bachelor degree, and nineteen to the
master or doctoral degree.
5In Round 2, the child could choose among four answers: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly
agree. This chapter coded strongly disagree as 1, disagree as 2, agree as 3, and strongly agree as 4 in Round
2.
6Dercon and Sanchez (2011) include nine questions to measure self-esteem. This chapter, however,
excludes, the question “I feel embarrassed by the work I have to do”, because of missing data for many
children.
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Table 4.2: Questions Measuring Non-cognitive Skills in the Young Lives Data for Vietnam
Question Mean SD Min Max
Self-esteem 3.73 0.43 2.38 5.00
I feel proud to show where I live 3.57 0.94 1.00 5.00
I am proud of my clothes 3.52 0.86 1.00 5.00
I feel proud of the job done by household head 3.87 0.86 1.00 5.00
I am proud because I have the right books, pen-
cils etc
3.50 1.17 1.00 5.00
I am proud of the work I have to do 3.47 1.11 1.00 5.00
I am proud of my shoes 3.84 0.83 1.00 5.00
I am proud that I have the correct uniform 4.19 0.67 1.00 5.00
The job I do makes me feel proud 3.79 0.80 1.00 5.00
Self efficacy 3.69 0.40 2.20 4.80
If I try hard I can improve my situation in life 4.14 0.65 1.00 5.00
Other people in my family make all the deci-
sions about how I spend my time
2.60 0.99 1.00 5.00
I like to make plans for my future studies and
work
4.07 0.70 1.00 5.00
I have a choice about the work I do 2.87 1.05 1.00 5.00
If I study hard, I will be rewarded by a better
job in the future
4.39 0.61 1.00 5.00
Aspirations
Imagine you had no constraints and could stay
at school as long as you like. What level of for-
mal education would you like to complete?
14.72 2.67 0.00 19.00
Notes: 1. The summary statistics in this table is for older cohort in Round 3 (Self-
efficacy and aspirations) and younger cohort in Round 3 (Self-esteem). 2. This
table only reports summary indices calculated by the average of relevant questions.
For the summary statistics for the total of relevant question, see Table 4.3.
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4.3.3 Measurement of Liquidity Constraints
A liquidity constrained household can be defined as a household that cannot obtain the
amount of cash it needs and also can paid back (Jappelli, 1990). The sources of cash are
various, such as savings, assets, and loans.
Following the definition of Jappelli (1990), this chapter classifies a household as liquidity
constrained if it answers “No” to following question7
 Question 1: Would your household be able to raise 300,000 VND (in Round 3, for
Round 2 the figure was 230,000 VND) in one week if you needed it?8
Answers : Yes / Probably / No
4.3.4 Rainfall Data
The other main source of data for the analysis in this study is rainfall data, including the
past rainfall volatility and current rainfall shocks. For more details about the rainfall data,
please see Chapter 2.
7For more explanation of the definition of a liquidity constrained household, please see Chapter 2.
8300,000 VND in 2009 was about 16.25 in 2009 USD. 230,000 VND in 2006 is about 14.94 in 2006 USD.
Vietnam’s GDP per capita in 2009 was 1,232 USD, and 797 USD in 2006. (Econstat.com)
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4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Measuring the Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Children’s Non-
cognitive Skills using Ordinary Least Squares Analysis
To measure the effect of liquidity credit constraints on children’s non-cognitive skills, this
chapter will estimate the following equation:
yi,h,c,t = αLh,c,t +
I∑
i=1
βiXi,h,c,t + τc + εi,h,c,t (4.3)
where yi,h,c,t is the non-cognitive skills of child i from household h in community c when
the child is t years old. Lh,c,t is originally a categorical variable that equals one when the
household “can raise the money”, equals two when the household “probably can raise the
money”, and equals three when the households “cannot raise the money.” This studies uses
dummy variables of each category in the empirical specification. The Xi variables are the
characteristics of the child and his or her household, such as sex, mother’s education, father’s
education, mother’s religion, household income, rural or urban residence, and household size,
and the child’s BMI (weight over height squared) when he or she was first surveyed (when
the younger cohort was 6 to 19 months old and the older cohort was 7–8 years old). The
variable τc allows for community-specific fixed effects and εi,h,c,t is an error term.
This chapter also estimates the effect of liquidity constraints in Round 2 on children’s
non-cognitive skills 3 years later. The specification is as follows:
yi,h,c,t = αLh,c,t−1 +
I∑
i=1
βiXi,h,c,t + τc + εi,h,c,t (4.4)
where Lh,c,t−1 is the liquidity constraints variable in the previous round.
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4.4.2 Measuring the Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Child’s Non-cognitive
Skills using Two Stage Least Squares Analysis
OLS estimates of equations (4.3) and (4.4) may be biased and inconsistent when the liquid-
ity constraints are endogenous. That is, the liquidity constraints may be correlated with
the error terms in equations (4.3) and (4.4), in which case the OLS estimates will be biased
and inconsistent. To deal with the potential bias, this chapter instruments the liquidity
constraint variable. This chapter uses the existence of a credit union in the community, the
existence of a savings cooperatives in the community, the existence of relatives in the com-
munity, and the volatility and shock of rainfall as instrumental variables.9 The effect of the
rainfall variables may depend on the occupation of household head. So the rainfall volatility
and rainfall shocks variables interact with father’s occupation. Using these instrumental
variables, the first stage equation is as follows:
Lh,c,t = γCPc,t + κSCi,c,t + δRELi,h,c,t + RVc +RSc,t +
I∑
i=1
θiXi,h,c,t + ζc + εi,h,c,t (4.5)
where CPc,t is a dummy variable of the existence of credit program, SCc,t is a dummy vari-
able of the existence of savings cooperative, RELh,c,t is a dummy variable of the existence
of relatives in community, RVc is the past rainfall volatility from 1979 to 1993, and RSc,t
is current rainfall shocks. To allow the effect of the rainfall variables to vary by occupa-
tion, this study use interaction term of rain fall variables and father’s occupation. The
occupation variable is a categorical variable with seven categorical values: self-employed in
the agricultural sector, wage-employed in the agricultural sector, other in the agricultural
sector, self-employed in the non-agricultural sector, wage-employed in the non-agricultural
sector, other in the non-agricultural sector, and unemployed.10
9The community level variables are used only when the community fixed effects is not included in the
equation (4.3) and (4.4).
10For the validity of these instrumental variables, please see Chapter 2.
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4.5 Results
Table 4.3 presents summary statistics of non-cognitive skills and other individual covariates
by the status of liquidity constraints. Some noticeable patterns are that there are differences
in the non-cognitive skills by liquidity constraint status. The children from the non-liquidity
constrained household have higher self-esteem and self-efficacy and expect more education
than children from the liquidity constrained household.
The analysis below uses the standardized scores of the summary indices (average score
of relevant questions). Only the results using the standardized scores of indices are reported
in the following section.
4.5.1 OLS Estimates of the Effect of Current Liquidity Constraints on
Children’s Non-cognitive Skills
Table 4.4 presents OLS results of the effect of liquidity constraints on children’s non-
cognitive skills in Round 3 for the younger cohort. Each column is from estimating equa-
tion (4.3), controlling for only the individual covariates (columns 1 and 3), and controlling
for individual covariates plus community fixed effects (columns 2 and 4). The dependent
variables are all standardized scores of the summary indices calculated by the average of
relevant questions. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. The younger
cohort children were 7-8 years old at that time.
The OLS results in Table 4.4 suggest that a high degree of liquidity constraints lowers
children’s self-esteem by 0.589 standard deviations (Column 2). As seen in column 4 of
Table 4.4, children from the households who “probably can raise money” tend to have
lower levels (0.238 standard deviations) of self-efficacy compared to children from non-
liquidity constrained households. There is no significant effect of liquidity constraints when
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households answer that they “cannot raise the money.” It may be because of large standard
error and small number of households who answer “cannot” (Column 4 in Table 4.4).11 This
chapter conducts a Hausman test, checking the null-hypothesis that there is no systematic
difference between coefficient of “probably” and that of “cannot.” The P-value is 0.19 for
Column 4 in Table 4.4, so one can not reject the null-hypothesis. It indicates that liquidity
constraints has negative effect on children’s self-esteem and aspirations when they were 7–8
years old.
Tables 4.5 and Table 4.6 present the empirical analysis about the relationship between
parents’ liquidity constraints and older cohort’s non-cognitive skills when the older cohort
was 11–12 years and 14–15 years old, respectively. One interesting to notice is that there
is positive effect of “probably can raise” on children’s aspirations (Column 6 in Table 4.5).
Even though there is no statistically significant effect of “cannot raise” in Column 6, the
Hausman test tell us that one cannot reject the null-hypothesis that two coefficients are
identical (P-value is 0.7). There are also negative effect of liquidity constraints on children’s
self-esteem and self-efficacy (Column 2 and 4 in Table 4.5), when they were 11–12 years old.
The result in Table 4.5 indicates that liquidity constraints have mixed effect on children’s
non-cognitive skills for older cohort.
In Round 3, older cohort children from the households that answer “probably” has
lower self-efficacy than children from household who can raise the money by 0.156 standard
deviations (Column 2 in Table 4.6). Again the Hausman test checking the difference between
two coefficients of liquidity constraints variables in Column 2 indicates that one cannot
reject the null -hypothesis. It means that there is negative effect of liquidity constraints on
children’s self-efficacy when children were 14–15 years old.
Similar to the results from Chapter 2, which estimated the effect of liquidity constraints
on children’s school performance, the OLS results indicate that liquidity constraints have
11About 4 percent of total household (36 out of 871) answer that the household “cannot” raise the money.
For more details about the proportion of household by the status of liquidity constraint, please see Table
4.3.
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severe negative effects on a child’s non cognitive skills. The size of effect is larger for younger
cohort (0.2–0.6 standard deviations) than for older cohorts (0.2–0.4 standard deviations).
There is mixed effect of liquidity constraints when children were 11–12 years old. This re-
sults suggest that a child’s non-cognitive skills may be determined in the early stage of life.
When the child is young, their non-cognitive skills are in the process of formation and may
be sensitive to parent’s financial constraints. When child ages 11–12 or older, his or her
non-cognitive skills may not be sensitively affected by parent’s financial constraints anymore.
4.5.2 OLS Estimates of the Effect of Liquidity Constraints in Round 2
on Children’s Non-cognitive Skills in Round 3
The dynamic effect of liquidity constraints is more severe for younger cohort (equation
4.4). Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present the effect of liquidity constraints in Round 2 on children’s
non-cognitive skills in Round 3 for the younger and older cohorts, respectively.
The liquidity constraints in the previous round (Round 2) lower children’s self-esteem
and in Round 3 by 0.406 standard deviations for the younger cohort (Columns 2 in Table
4.7). This result indicates that the liquidity constraints when children were 4–5 years old
have a negative effect on their self-esteem when they were 7–8 years old. The Hausman
test comparing coefficients of “probably” and “cannot” indicates that there is no system-
atic difference between two coefficients. It means that there is negative effect of liquidity
constraints on children’s self-efficacy three years after.
The negative effect of liquidity constraints in the previous round is also shown for older
cohort, but the size of effect is relatively smaller than that for younger cohort and the signifi-
cance level is low. Table 4.8 shows that there is negative effect from the liquidity constraints
on children’s self-esteem by 0.266 standard deviations in next round. The significance level
is only 10 percent, however.
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This chapter also runs same regression but including the liquidity constraints in Round
2 and Round 3 at the same time. The result is reported in the Appendix C (Table C1 and
C2). Table C1 indicates that liquidity constraints when the child was 4–5 years old have
a negative effect on child’ non-cognitive skills when the child was 7–8 years old (0.1–0.3
standard deviations). However, as seen in Table C2, liquidity constraints three years ago
does not have significant effect when the child was 14–15 years old.
4.5.3 IV Estimates of the Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Children’s
Non-cognitive Skills
While the OLS results are often statistically significant, they may be biased. To address
this bias, this chapter estimates equation (4.5) using instrumental variables. The first stage
result indicates that F-statistics are between 5–12, which indicates that the instrumental
variable is not unusually weak.12
Table 4.9 presents IV estimates of the liquidity constraints effect on child’s non-cognitive
skills in the same round. Specification A includes a dummy for relatives, a dummy for credit
programs, and a dummy for savings cooperatives as instrumental variables. Specification
B includes all instrumental variables in Specification A plus past rainfall volatility, and
Specification C includes all instrumental variables in Specification A plus current rainfall
shocks. Specification C indicates that liquidity constraints lower younger cohort children’s
self-efficacy by 0.047 standard deviations. However, this chapter cannot observe any neg-
ative effect from children’s non-cognitive skills when they were 11-12 years old and 14–15
years old. There are some positive effect for older cohort in Round 2: liquidity constraints
has positive effect on older cohort’s aspirations (Column 3 and 6). But the significance level
is only 10 percent.
12As discussed in Chapter 2, the critical value of F-statistics to avoid biased result is five (Stock and Yogo,
2005). For more about the discussion on the first stage of IV estimates, please see Chapter 2.
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Table 4.10 presents the effect of liquidity constraints on children’s non-cognitive skills
in the next round. The results are similar to those of OLS for older cohort: the liquidity
constraints when child was 11–12 years old does not have any effect on child’s non-cognitive
skills 3 years after, while there is some negative effect of liquidity constraints when child
was 4–5 years old on child’s non cognitive skills when child was 7–8 years old (Column 8).
One interesting result in Table 4.10 is that the liquidity constraints in Round 2 has
significant and positive effect on older cohort’s self-efficacy. We can observe that liquidity
constraints when a child was 11–12 years old have positive effect on child’s self-efficacy
measured when the child was 14–15 years old by 0.694 standard deviations (Column 2).
This result may refer to the critical time of non-cognitive skills formation. The liquidity
constraints may be “out of date” for older cohort when they are in adolescent stage of life.
Another possible explanation is that children’s tough time when they were 11–12 years old
due to liquidity constraints may have positive effect on their non-cognitive skills and “build”
their characteristics more stronger.
4.6 Conclusion
This study examines the linkage between parents’ liquidity constraints and children’s non-
cognitive skills. Most of the studies measuring the effect of liquidity constraints have fo-
cused on the “external constraints” and have measured how the liquidity constraints lower
children’s access to school, good tutors, quality books, etc. This study focuses on the
relationship between “external constraints” and “internal constraints” by measuring how
liquidity constraints affect children’s feelings and emotions.
The empirical result indicates that parents’ liquidity constraints have negative and sig-
nificant effects on children’s self-esteem and self-efficacy when the child is in a young age
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(7–8 years old). Both OLS and IV estimation indicate that the effect is mixed when the
child is older (11–12 years old and 14–15 years old).
The link between parents’ liquidity constraints and children’s non-cognitive skills can
have important implications for policy makers in developing countries. As education has
been considered a top priority for development, policy makers have implemented many
educational policies such as subsidies and loans. The primary goal of these policies is to
support families with financial difficulties and increase children’s access to school and a
high quality education. The results of this chapter indicate that releasing the parents’
external constraints may reduce children’s internal constraints by increasing their non-
cognitive skills, especially for young children.
This study suggests that when supporting families with difficulty, releasing external
constraints may be important to enhance both children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
Also, because the effect of liquidity constraints is more severe for younger children, support
for families with young children is needed. There are several education policies that support
secondary-school-aged students or college-aged students. There are relatively few subsidies
for families with young children. Considering that non-cognitive skills are mostly developed
and affected by the environment when a child is in the earliest stages of life, policies for
younger students (pre-school and the early years of elementary school), such as subsidies
or credit program, are needed. Such policies can include enhancing public education for
younger children and also financial and emotional support for families with difficulties.
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Table 4.4: OLS Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Children’s Non-cognitive
Skills in Round 3 (Younger cohort)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Self-esteem Self-esteem Self-efficacy Self-efficacy
Liquidity Constraints
Probably can raise -0.348*** -0.339*** -0.247** -0.238**
(0.0875) (0.0813) (0.0948) (0.0942)
Can not raise -0.594* -0.589*** -0.0809 -0.0190
(0.334) (0.138) (0.165) (0.171)
Individual Covariates
age in months -0.00661 0.0101 0.0112 0.0187*
(0.0107) (0.00974) (0.00673) (0.00950)
gender of yl child -0.121 -0.0818 -0.0472 -0.0481
(0.0722) (0.0779) (0.0701) (0.0749)
Mother’s education (yrs) 0.0128 0.00932 -0.00380 0.00178
(0.0216) (0.0161) (0.0115) (0.0128)
Father’s education (yrs) 0.0290* 0.0412*** -0.00484 0.00534
(0.0171) (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.0138)
Mother’s religion is catholic 0.925*** 0.667*** -0.00233 -0.153
(0.296) (0.201) (0.256) (0.248)
buddism 0.461*** 0.312* -0.133 -0.222*
(0.144) (0.157) (0.182) (0.127)
protestant 0.669* 0.630* 0.747* 0.381
(0.355) (0.323) (0.375) (0.460)
Cao Dai 1.336*** 0.686*** -0.290 -0.328
(0.333) (0.143) (0.294) (0.278)
none 0.394*** 0.410*** -0.122 -0.236***
(0.0679) (0.0646) (0.0815) (0.0515)
Household size 0.0136 0.0220 -0.00361 -0.00182
(0.0344) (0.0323) (0.0264) (0.0279)
Live in rural 0.536*** 0.0135 0.477*** 0.269***
(0.126) (0.113) (0.163) (0.0875)
BMI -0.0113 -0.00450 0.0298 0.0184
(0.0227) (0.0240) (0.0268) (0.0257)
Value of assets (mil) -0.00891 -0.0204 -0.0149 -0.0170
(0.0239) (0.0205) (0.0252) (0.0252)
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Observations 835 835 871 871
R-squared 0.085 0.260 0.049 0.127
Notes: 1. Self-esteem and self-efficacy are calculated by the average of answers
of relevant questions. The summary indices are standardized. 2. Liquidity Con-
straints : “Can raise 300,000 VND” is the omitted category. 3. Standard errors
clustered within village in parentheses. *** p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table 4.6: OLS Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Children’s Non-cognitive
Skills in Round 3 (Older cohort)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Self-efficacy Self-efficacy Aspirations Aspirations
Liquidity Constraints
Probably can raise -0.170** -0.156* -0.0314 0.00651
(0.0789) (0.0903) (0.205) (0.208)
Cannot raise -0.137 -0.156 -0.309 -0.364
(0.235) (0.260) (0.355) (0.373)
Individual Covariates
Age in months -0.0108 -0.00481 -0.0425 -0.0325
(0.0133) (0.0150) (0.0262) (0.0248)
Female -0.117 -0.132 -0.735*** -0.649***
(0.0804) (0.0902) (0.136) (0.129)
Mother’s education (yrs) 0.0264 0.0161 0.115*** 0.0903**
(0.0170) (0.0143) (0.0363) (0.0330)
Father’s education (yrs) 0.00876 0.0134 0.118*** 0.135***
(0.0155) (0.0161) (0.0340) (0.0309)
Mother’s religion is catholic -0.0341 0.115 -1.404* -2.270***
(0.849) (0.718) (0.814) (0.576)
buddism -0.683 -0.572 -1.716*** -2.372***
(0.797) (0.700) (0.340) (0.591)
protestant -0.407 -0.534 -2.034** -2.551***
(0.854) (0.769) (0.862) (0.782)
Cao Dai -0.619 -0.365 -3.623* -4.752**
(0.934) (0.840) (2.095) (2.290)
none -0.541 -0.331 -1.780*** -2.340***
(0.849) (0.720) (0.341) (0.369)
Household size 0.0373 0.0537 -0.246*** -0.194**
(0.0314) (0.0342) (0.0835) (0.0826)
Live in Rural -0.0647 0.635 -0.185 1.276*
(0.0835) (0.475) (0.161) (0.731)
BMI -0.00165 -0.00788 0.00401 0.0155
(0.0375) (0.0392) (0.0699) (0.0683)
Value of assets (mil) 0.00222 -0.00111 -0.0305*** -0.0288***
(0.00430) (0.00353) (0.00611) (0.00506)
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Observations 674 674 809 809
R-squared 0.037 0.093 0.165 0.215
Notes: 1. Self-efficacy are calculated by the average of answers of relevant ques-
tions. The summary indices are standardized. 2. Liquidity Constraints : “Can
raise 300,000 VND” is the omitted category. 3. Standard errors clustered within
village in parentheses. *** p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table 4.7: OLS Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints (Round 2) on Children’s
Non-cognitive Skills in Later stage (Round 3) for Younger Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES (Round 3) Self-esteem Self-esteem Self-
efficacy
Self-
efficacy
Liquidity Constraints
Probably can raise in Round 2 -0.0908 -0.209*** -0.246*** -0.209**
(0.0818) (0.0692) (0.0829) (0.0973)
Cannot raise in Round 2 -0.257* -0.406** -0.113 -0.151
(0.142) (0.151) (0.138) (0.141)
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Observations 835 835 872 872
R-squared 0.061 0.251 0.049 0.126
Notes: 1. Self-esteem and self-efficacy are calculated by the average of answers
of relevant questions. The summary indices are standardized. 2. Liquidity Con-
straints : “Can raise 300,000 VND” is the omitted category. 3. Standard errors
clustered within village in parentheses. *** p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table 4.8: OLS Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints (Round 2) on Children’s
Non-cognitive Skills in Later Stage (Round 3) for Older Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Self-
efficacy
Self-
efficacy
Aspiration Aspiration
Liquidity Constraints
Probably can raise in Round 2 -0.000950 -0.0175 0.225 0.305
(0.0675) (0.0805) (0.225) (0.239)
Cannot raise in Round 2 -0.241* -0.266* 0.139 0.301
(0.120) (0.132) (0.337) (0.353)
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Observations 674 674 809 809
R-squared 0.036 0.096 0.170 0.216
Notes: 1. Self-esteem and self-efficacy are calculated by the average of answers
of relevant questions. The summary indices are standardized. 2. Liquidity Con-
straints : “Can raise 300,000 VND (230,000 VND for Round 2)” is the omitted
category. 3. Standard errors clustered within village in parentheses. *** p<0.01.**
p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 of this dissertation present the results of empirical analysis that
measures the effect of parents’ liquidity constraints on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive
skills. The results contribute to current discussions concerning the effect of liquidity con-
straints on investments in human capital, especially for young children in the early stage of
life, in the context of developing countries. Chapter 4 also contributes to the rapid growth
of knowledge on how and when children’s non-cognitive skills are developed.
Chapter 2 shows that parents’ liquidity constraints have significant negative effects on
children’s cognitive skills. The size of effect is larger when the child is in his or her early stage
of life (4–5 years old and 7–8 years old). To control for potential bias due to the endogeneity
of liquidity constraints, this chapter instruments the liquidity constraints with past rainfall
volatility, current rainfall shocks, and the existence in the community of subsidized credit
programs, of savings cooperatives, and of relatives. Both the OLS and IV analysis support
that the liquidity constraints of parents are more severe for young children.
Chapter 4 shows the result of measuring the effect of parents’ liquidity constraints on
children’s non-cognitive skills such as self-esteem, self-efficacy, and aspirations. Similar to
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the result on children’s cognitive skills, the OLS results show that the liquidity constraints
of parents lower the children’s non-cognitive skills when children are young (7–8 years old).
However, the liquidity constraints have mixed effect on children’s non-cognitive skills when
they are older (11–12 years old and 14–15 years old). One interesting result is the dynamic
effect, measuring the effect of liquidity constraints on non-cognitive skills three years later.
Chapter 4 found that liquidity constraints that occurred when children were 4–5 years old
lowered their non-cognitive skills when they were 7–8 years old. This result is consistent
with other literature, which emphasizes the importance of early investment in children’s
human capital accumulation (e.g., Heckman (2000) and Brooks-Gunn and Duncan (1997)).
These results have policy implications for developing countries. As education is one of
the top priorities for developing countries, policy-makers have tried to enhance the quantity
and quality of public education by increasing government spending on the public costs. As
a result of these effort, education in developing countries has been dramatically enhanced
in the past decade. The primary school enrollment rate (gross) for developing countries
was 100.9 percent in 2012 (UNESCO, 2015). However, there are still gaps in pre-primary
school enrollment between developed and developing countries: the gross enrollment rate in
pre-primary school was only 48.8 percent for developing countries, while it was 86.3 percent
for developed countries in 2012.1 This indicates that there are many children behind in
education when they are pre-school age in developing countries.
The empirical results in Chapters 2 and 4 also show that children’s human capital is
more affected when they are younger (4–5 years old and 7–8 years old). There are relative
small or insignificant effect form parent’s liquidity constraints on children’s human capita
when they are older (11–12 years old or older). This means that children in the school
are less affected by parents’ liquidity constraints. Their human capital may be affected by
school and teacher characteristics. In case of non-cognitive skills, it may also possible that
non-cognitive skills are formulated in the early stage of life and not sensitive to parent’s
1In Vietnam, the gross rate of enrollment in primary school was 104 percent, while the enrollment rate
in pre-primary school is 77 percent in 2012 (UNESCO, 2015).
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liquidity constraints anymore when children are older. The policy implication of these
two essays is that the policy-makers should consider subsidies for families with liquidity
constraints to enhance children’s human capital.
Chapter 3, entitled “The Influence of Licensing Engineers on their Labor Market,” pro-
vides a first look at the effect of regulation on the working hours and wage of engineers. The
more rigid the requirements to get the license and the longer time to become an engineer,
the further that working hours of engineers increases and ultimately customer access to
engineers is reduced, while there is no significant effect on engineers’ wage. Occupational li-
censing, which is one of the fastest-growing labor market institutions, has recently attracted
the attention of many scholars. This chapter contributes to the growing literature on the
effect of occupational licensing on the labor market.
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Appendix A
Table A1: IV Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Child Test Score in Round
2 using Fake IV
Younger Cohorts Older Cohorts
IV: Fake IV (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PPVT CDA PPVT Math
Liquidity Constraints 0.868 0.426 -1.068 0.843
(0.929) (1.459) (14.07) (18.66)
Observations 1,456 1,456 812 812
IV F-stat 1.168 1.168 0.00751 0.00751
Notes: 1. Liquidity Constraints variable : 1 equals “Can raise money”, 2 equals
“Probably can raise money”, 3 equals “Cannot raise money”. 2. Test scores are
standardized. 3. Standard errors clustered within village in parentheses. ***
p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table A2: OLS Estimation of Effect of Early Liquidity constraints (Round 2) on Child Test
Score (Round 3) by cohort, dropping Liquidity constraints in Round 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PPVT PPVT Math Math
Panel A: Younger Cohort
Probably can raise in Round 2 -0.0190 -0.0288 -0.121** -0.0700
(0.0382) (0.0297) (0.0567) (0.0485)
Cannot raise in Round 2 -0.0833 -0.0600 -0.195** -0.0818
(0.0555) (0.0458) (0.0952) (0.0855)
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,456 1,456
R-squared 0.284 0.390 0.306 0.405
Panel B: Older Cohort
Probably can raise in Round 2 0.00240 0.0507 0.0436 0.0322
(0.0414) (0.0378) (0.108) (0.110)
Cannot raise in Round 2 -0.188** -0.0693 -0.120 -0.156
(0.0884) (0.0684) (0.173) (0.138)
Observations 812 812 812 812
R-squared 0.228 0.439 0.223 0.351
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Notes: 1. Liquidity Constraints : “Can raise 230,000 VND” is the omitted cate-
gory. 2. Test scores are standardized. 3.Standard errors clustered within village
in parentheses. *** p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1. 4. Individual covariates are: age,
gender, mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s religion, household size,
a dummy for living in Rural, BMI, and household income.
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Table C1: OLS Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints (Round 2) on Children’s
Non-cognitive Skills in Later stage (Round 3) for Younger Cohort, including Liquidity
Constraints in Round 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES (Round 3) Self-esteem Self-esteem Self-
efficacy
Self-
efficacy
Liquidity Constraints
Probably can raise in Round 2 -0.0262 -0.164** -0.195** -0.170*
(0.0865) (0.0701) (0.0786) (0.0943)
Cannot raise in Round 2 -0.131 -0.312* -0.0491 -0.100
(0.155) (0.166) (0.127) (0.139)
Probably can raise in Round 3 -0.325*** -0.279*** -0.219** -0.212**
(0.0973) (0.0911) (0.0896) (0.0899)
Cannot raise in Round 3 -0.562 -0.525*** -0.0708 0.00376
(0.338) (0.153) (0.151) (0.156)
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Observations 835 835 871 871
R-squared 0.088 0.269 0.060 0.135
Notes: 1. Self-esteem and self-efficacy are calculated by the average of answers of
relevant questions. The summary indices are standardized. 2. Liquidity Constraints
: “Can raise 300,000 VND (230,000 VND for Round 2)” is the omitted category. 3.
Standard errors clustered within village in parentheses. *** p<0.01.** p<0.05. *
p<0.1.
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Table C2: OLS Estimation of Effect of Liquidity Constraints (Round 2) on Children’s Non-
cognitive Skills in Later stage (Round 3) for Older Cohort, including Liquidity Constraints
in Round 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Self-
efficacy
Self-
efficacy
Aspirations Aspirations
Liquidity Constraints
Probably can raise in Round 2 0.0271 0.00733 0.234 0.325
(0.0740) (0.0848) (0.227) (0.242)
Cannot raise in Round 2 -0.172 -0.203 0.205 0.410
(0.117) (0.128) (0.326) (0.344)
Probably can raise in Round 3 -0.170* -0.148 -0.0755 -0.0609
(0.0920) (0.0986) (0.207) (0.208)
Cannot raise in Round 3 -0.100 -0.108 -0.364 -0.539
(0.228) (0.261) (0.347) (0.367)
Individual Covariates Y Y Y Y
Community FE N Y N Y
Observations 674 674 809 809
R-squared 0.040 0.097 0.172 0.219
Notes: 1. Self-efficacy are calculated by the average of answers of relevant questions.
The summary indices are standardized. 2. Liquidity Constraints : “Can raise 300,000
VND (230,000 VND for Round 2)” is the omitted category. 3. Standard errors clustered
within village in parentheses. *** p<0.01.** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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